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CASE NOTES
Admiralty - Action by Seaman Not Maintainable on Law Side of
Federal District Courts Under General Maritime Law.-Plaintiff, a Spanish
seaman who was a member of the crew on a vessel of Spanish registry, was
injured aboard ship as it lay in harbor in the port of New York. An action
under the Jones Act,' as well as an action for maintenance and cure, unsea-
worthiness and a maritime tort brought under section 1331 of the Judicial Code,2
were instituted on the law side of the district court against Compania Trans-
atlantica, the Spanish owner of the ship, and others.3 The district court 4 dis-
missed both actions against Compania Transatlantica, and the court of appeals
affirmed. 5 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, four
Justices dissenting. In the absence of diversity of citizenship, the district court
has no jurisdiction on the law side of a general maritime action under section
1331. The Court further held, three Justices dissenting, an alien seaman sailing
on a foreign vessel may not recover against the alien owner under the Jones Act
for injuries suffered in the territorial waters of the United States. Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
The Court in the present case was confronted with two problems. The first
was whether a maritime action might be instituted on the law side of the district
court under section 1331, which provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . .
arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." Any
solution to this problem, of course, would depend to a great extent on the
1. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952) provides: "Any seaman who shall
suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an
action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes
of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of
personal injury to railway employees shall apply ..
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
3. In addition to the actions against Compania Transatlantica, the plaintiff instituted
identical actions in the same proceeding against Garcia & Diaz, Inc., the husbanding agent
for Compania Transatlantica's ships in New York. The plaintiff further alleged liability of
the International Terminal Operating Co. and Quin Lumber Co., who were working aboard
ship at the time plaintiff sustained his injury, pursuant to an oral contract with Garcia &
Diaz, Inc.
4. 142 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The court reasoned that there were four possible
grounds for jurisdiction in this matter: (1) The Jones Act, (2) a federal question, (3)
diversity, and (4) discretion under the general maritime law. The court held that it
could not entertain jurisdiction on any of these grounds.
5. 244 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1957). On appeal to the circuit court, plaintiff argued that
by virtue of the Treaty with Spain of Friendship and General Relations, July 3, 1902,
art. VI, 33 Stat. 2105 (effective April 14, 1903), the district court might entertain the
action under the Jones Act. The court answered: "We find nothing in the text of that
Article which confers upon the appellant, a Spanish subject, the substantive rights created
by the Jones Act." 244 F.2d at 410.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
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exclusiveness of section 1333 of the Judicial Code,7 which provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . of . . . any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."8 This problem has been the
subject of conflicting decisions in the circuit courts.0
The majority here, employing the reasoning of Paditano v. Yamashita
Kisen Kabushiki Kaiska,'0 concluded that the sweeping grant of jurisdic-
tion embodied in section 1331 is subject to an implied exception in admiralty
and maritime cases. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, maintained that
article m of the Constitution,1 which establishes the jurisdictional power of
the federal courts, contemplated that jurisdiction over cases in admiralty be
separate and exclusive of jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States. This exclusive classification of judicial
power was first noticed by the courts in American Ins. Co. v. Canter,12 wherein
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "the Constitution certainly contemplates
these as . . . distinct classes of cases; and if they are distinct, the grant of
jurisdiction over one of them does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other
two. The discrimination made between them, in the Constitution, is... con-
clusive against their identity."13  Since congressional history is silent14 as to
whether jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty cases is included in the
"arising under" provision15 from which section 1331 was ultimately derived,
the Court concluded that such jurisdiction was not contemplated within that
vehicle of federal judicial jurisdiction.1
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952).
8. The Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76, from which 28 U.S.C. § 1333 is
derived, provided: "Saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it." For the purpose of facilitating this dis-
cussion, we will employ the wording of the original enactment.
9. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952) (sustained jurisdiction on the
law side). Contra, Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F2d 615 (2d Cir.
1955) (denied jurisdiction); Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1950) (denied
jurisdiction).
10. 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955).
11. U.S. Const. art. IM, § 2, cl. 1 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . . . to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction....!
12. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). The exclusive classification of jurisdiction, criticized by
the dissent, has been subject to criticism by legal periodicals also. See, e.g., Note, The Ex-
pansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction to Maritime Claims: A New jurisdictional Theory,
66 Marv. L. Rev. 315 (1952); Note, Maritime Cases as Civil Actions in the United States
District Courts, 32 Tul. L. Rev. 696 (1958). But see Abbott, The United States Courts and
Their Practice 60 (3d ed. 1877).
13. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 544.
14. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 65-69 (1928); Chadbourn
& Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 639, 642-44 (1942).
15. See note 19 infra.
16. Such was the understanding of the early courts. See Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83
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The merit of the foregoing argument is in the precept that the federal gov-
ernment, including the judiciary, has no power unless granted by the Constitu-
tion, 17 and such power cannot be assumed but must be expressly shown.
Hence, the failure to show intent by the framers of the Constitution to include
admiralty jurisdiction within the power to try cases arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties, although such maritime rights may incidentally arise
thereunder, is fatal. Nevertheless, any solution which does not consider the
possibility of maritime jurisdiction within the terms of the "arising under"
clause of section 1331 is incomplete. Failure to do this has given rise to
criticism of the Paduano decision,' 8 and such criticism might well apply to the
case under consideration.
The Judiciary Act of 1875 granted jurisdiction to the federal district courts
"of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity .. .arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . ."19 For the federal district
court to entertain a case under this statute the case must not only "arise under"
but it must be a suit of a "civil nature at common law or in equity .... 20
The court in Doucette v. Vincent2' reasoned that a maritime action was a
"civil action at common law" and, consequently, fulfilled that provision. The
court reached this conclusion on an understanding that at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution there was concurrent jurisdiction in common law
and admiralty courts to try maritime claims of an in personam nature, and the
Constitution merely preserved the judicial procedure existing at that time. 22
Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in the present case, reached the same conclu-
sion. He reasoned that since the saving clause of section 1333 saved to suitors
a "common law remedy," and section 1331 granted jurisdiction over cases of a
civil nature at common law, the maritime cause of action saved from the
former would fall within the provision of the latter. The defect in this reasoning
is dual. It ignores the exclusive nature of the distribution of judicial power as
U.S. 522, 533 (1872); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. 185 (1870); The Belfast, 74 U.S. 624,
642 (1868).
17. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 440, 444 (1850). See also Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273,
279 (1896); Mansfield C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); The Lottawanna,
88 U.S. 558, 576 (1874).
18. Note, Maritime Cases as Civil Action in the United States District Courts, 32 Tul.
L. Rev. 696, 711 (1958).
19. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Section 1331 of the Judicial Code,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952), provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy ... arises under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States." This terminology was not intended to change the meaning
of the original Act, but was made in conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 2. Reviser's note to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
20. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 843 (1st Cir. 1952). See also Note, Maritime
Cases as Civil Actions in the United States District Courts, 32 Tul. L. Rev. 696, 706
(1958).
21. 194 F.2d 834 (Ist Cir. 1952).
22. Id. at 841. The court based this reasoning on Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S.
375 (1924); Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U.S. 118 (1880).
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embodied in the Constitution, 2 3 and ignores the principle that neither the mari-
time remedy of maintenance and cure nor that of unseaworthiness falls within
the saving clause, since neither is a "common law remedy" within the meaning
of the saving clause of section 1333.24
Mr. Justice Brennan further reasoned that the plaintiff's general maritime
cause of action fell within the "arising under" provision of section 1331 and,
consequently, fulfilled that provision of the statute. In order that a maritime
remedy be afforded under section 1331 the dissent realized what it thought to
be the necessity of removing the action from the scope of section 1333.2 This
was accomplished not by adhering to a literal interpretation of the saving clause
and attempting to remove the action thereunder, but rather by reasoning that
since section 1332 of the Judicial Code0 1 constituted an exception to the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, section 1333 was not an exclusive grant
of admiralty jurisdiction, but was subject to exception.2 7 Being capable of
exception, the dissent concluded that an action for a general maritime
remedy constituted such an exception. Relying on a long series of decisions
tracing from Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,28 the dissent argued that since the
23. See note 12 supra.
24. It is convincingly argued by Judge Dimock, in his concurring opinion in Paduano
v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615, 619 (2d Cir. 19S5), that the remedies
contemplated within the saving clause of § 1333 were not federal maritime remedies but
state common law remedies. Judge Dimock stated: "I cannot escape the conclusion that
the Congress which made that provision [the saving clause] felt that the district courts
to which it applied had been given no jurisdiction to enforce the maritime civil law by a
common law remedy. The provision seems to me to indicate the intention of Congress
that the district courts should have jurisdiction to enforce substantive maritime law only
by maritime remedies." 221 F.2d at 621. See also Note, The Expansion of Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdiction to Maritime Claims: A New Jurisdictional Theory, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
315 (1952).
25. The fallaciousness of the dissent's reasoning in this regard is apparent. If a mari-
time action is an action of a civil nature at common law within the meaning of § 1331,
there is no need to resort to the saving clause of § 1333 in the first place. The action
would be originally cognizable under § 1331.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
27. The dissent in so reasoning differed from the approach taken in Doucette v. Vincent,
194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952). In that case the court reasoned that the saving clause
excepted from § 1333 common law remedies which were provided by state aw. Never-
theless, where the federal element was sufficient, the law to be applied would be federal
maritime law. Then, by virtue of the adoption of maritime law by the Constitution as
the law of the United States, a maritime action would be a federal question and would
warrant the bringing of the action in a federal court. This reasoning relied heavily on
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), wherein the Court held that there
existed a body of federal maritime law which suspended any state law op2rating in the
same sphere. The weakness of the Doucette reasoning, supra, lies in the criticism to which
the Jensen case, supra, has been subjected. See Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.. 371 (1943) ;
Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942). Mir. justice Frankfurter referred to
the Jensen case, supra, as "that ill-starred decision." 317 US. at 259.
28. 244 US. 205 (1917). See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 US. 405 (1953);
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substantive law was federal maritime law, the right was a federally created
right or one arising under the "laws . . .of the United States" within the
meaning of section 133129
This argument is open to criticism. Assuming first that section 1333 does
not vest exclusive maritime jurisdiction in admiralty courts, does this mean
that an action under general maritime law falls outside of the purview of the
statute? To argue that it does since an express statutory exception shows
that it is capable of exception, is a non sequitur.
An additional difficulty in the reasoning of the dissent involves the validity of
the statement that an action under general maritime law is an action arising
under the laws of the United States. It is indeed true that the complaint, to
meet the requirement of the statute, "should show that he [the plaintiff] asserts
a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 230 Contrary to the
reasoning of the dissent, however, this alone does not suffice to make the action
one arising under the laws of the United States. By the greater weight of
authority, for an action to be included under the provision of section 1331 the
case must involve either the validity, the construction or the application of the
Acts of Congress.31 Since an action under general maritime law as alleged here
is itself not statutory and nor has it been incorporated into any federal statute,
it follows that such an action does not fall within section 1331.
In addition to the jurisdictional question presented by section 1331, the
Court determined that in the light of the criteria enumerated in Lauritzen v.
Larsen,3 2 the plaintiff could not maintain an action against his Spanish employer
under the Jones Act. The sole factor connecting the alien seaman to the
United States was the locus delecti, which was the port of New York. The
Court reasoned that since the locus delecti was an almost irrelevant factor,
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149 (1920); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
29. See note 6 and accompanying text.
30. Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461 (1894). If a question in-
volving the Constitution or laws of the United States is raised by defendant's reply, this
will not justify maintaining the action within the "arising under" provision of § 1331.
"The question whether a party claims a right under the Constitution or laws of the
United States is to be ascertained by the legal construction of its own allegations, and not
by the effect attributed to those allegations by the adverse party." New Jersey Cent.
R.R. v. Mills, 113 U.S. 249, 257 (1885).
31. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936); Shulthis v. McDougal, 225
U.S. 561, 569 (1912); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264 (1879). But see Note, The
Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction to Maritime Claims: A New Jurisdictional
Theory, 66 Hary. L. Rev. 315, 324 (1952), wherein it was stated that such a "limiting
conception of federal jurisdiction [is] attacked by most modern commentators .... "
Nevertheless, it would appear that such a "limited conception" still remains the law.
32. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). The criteria therein enumerated were: (1) the place of the
wrongful act, (2) law of the flag or the nation under which the ship sailed, (3) allegiance
or domicile of the injured party, (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner, (5) place
where the articles were signed, (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum, and (7) the law of
the forum. Id. at 583-91.
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according to the Lauritzen case,33 in determining the applicability of the Jones
Act, the plaintiff could not recover under that Act.
Recovery under the Jones Act, without exception, will be granted to any sea-
man aboard an American vessel.34 Such recovery has been allowed, although
the vessel is foreign, the injury occurring within the territorial waters of the
United States, where the seaman was either a citizen of the United StatesP5
or a resident alien.36 However, where the seaman was an alien aboard a
foreign vessel, and the injury occurred outside the territorial waters of the
United States, recovery under the Jones Act has not been allowedV7 The case
under consideration lies in-between. Here the Spanish seaman who had been
injured within the territorial waters of the United States sought recovery
under the Jones Act against the Spanish owner of the vessel. Although these
facts present a question of first impression for the Supreme Court, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York in The Magdapur,as and the
Second Circuit in The Paula,35 had previously come to the same conclusion as
the Supreme Court did here. It should also be noted that the Second Circuit
was not unwilling to apply the Act where the articles had been signed within
the United States,40 a factor not present in The Magdapur and The Parla.
This factor is also absent in the principle case. It seems only reasonable that
the locus delecti should not be controlling as far as the application of the Jones
Act or the maritime tort statute of any other country is concerned. As the
Court observed, "to impose on ships the duty of shifting from one standard of
compensation to another as the vessel passes the boundaries of territorial
waters would be not only an onerous but also an unduly speculative burden.' 41
The Court's decision as to the distribution of admiralty jurisdiction among
the lower federal courts is the only solution consonant with the historical
understanding of the matter and in accord with reasonable statutory construc-
tion. The Court, in the second problem, in denying the applicability of the
Jones Act by virtue of the criteria in Lacuritzen, might have more forcibly made
its point by a review of those decisions which previously had considered this
question.
33. "The test of location of the wrongful act or omission, however sufficient for torts
ashore, is of limited application to shipboard torts, because of the v-arleties of legal au-
thority over waters she may navigate." 345 U.S. at 5S3.
34. Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932).
35. Uravic v. Jarka Co., 2S2 U.S. 234 (1931).
36. Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 US. 742 (1943).
37. Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
33. 3 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
39. 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1937).
40. Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945).
41. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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Conflict of Laws - Lex Loci Contract-is as Governing Contract Rights.-
Defendant issued a personal property floater policy in Chicago to plaintiff,
then a resident of Illinois. The premium was remitted in a lump sum necessi-
tating no further payment. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to Florida where certain
of the insured property was either destroyed or stolen. Defendant declined to
honor a claim under the policy, and two years later the assured instituted suit
in a federal district court in Florida. On trial, judgment was rendered in favor
of plaintiff after a ruling that a stipulation in the policy banning an action
unless commenced within twelve months after discovery of the loss was void
under Florida law. On appeal, the circuit court held, one judge dissenting,
reversed. Florida's connections with the contract in question were too slight
to permit that state to give effect to its statutes so as to deprive the defendant,
who had secured a valid contract obligation under Illinois law, of its property
right, and such action was a violation of due process. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v.
Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
Although the contract in question was valid and binding in Illinois, the locus
contractus it was partially illegal under the law of Florida, the locus Jori.' It
has often been said, and equally as often held, that "the validity of a contract
is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where made, and if legal there is
generally enforcible anywhere."12  Nevertheless, the district court was of the
opinion that Florida's interest in the agreement was sufficient to override the
interest of Illinois, the place where the contract was executed. In doing so,
one provision of the contract was negated, and the remainder enforced in
terms never consented to by the defendant, a holding which broadened the
scope of its original obligations.
The circuit court, in reversing, concluded that while a court in a jurisdiction
declaring illegal the acts to be performed under a contract may relegate
litigants to another forum by refusing enforcement, 3 it may not so readily
alter contract obligations by chosing to enforce it according to its own laws.4
The majority held that the application of Florida law to "rewrite" the contract
would constitute a denial of due process.5 It found Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
v. Delta & Pine Land Co.6 squarely in point and controlling. The circuit court
1. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.03 (1943).
2. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. R.R., 254 N.Y. 407, 414, 173 N.E. 564, 567 (1930).
3. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y.
288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953). It is to be noted that a state may not bar such an action
under all circumstances. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
4. "But to deny judicial enforcement of a contract through its courts when such con-
tract sufficiently offends local policy is a very different thing from rewriting a contract and
enforcing it in a manner contrary to the undertaking of the makers." Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 76 (1954) (concurring opinion), rehearing denied, 348
U.S. 921 (1955).
5. The court having so ruled never arrived at the question of whether or not the full
faith and credit clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, or impairment of contract clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, had been violated. It would appear, however, that considerations which
govern a decision as regards either of these clauses apply with equal force to the others.
See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
6. 292 U.S. 143, rehearing denied, 292 U.S. 607 (1934).
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reasoned that as late as 1954 the Supreme Court7 cited with approval the
Hartford case and, therefore, the principle established in that decision was
still unquestionably the law, namely, that a state's interest derived from con-
nections with a foreign contract would govern that state's right to strike down
a part thereof as repugnant to public policy.
In light of recent developments, however, it is highly debatable whether the
facts of the Hartford case dictate a like result today. Those decisions cited
by the court as reaffirming the Hartford case are clearly distinguishable and
erosive of the proposition which it purportedly supports. Lauritzcn v. Larsens
involved a personal injury to a foreign seaman occurring aboard a foreign
vessel in alien waters. The Court there refused to ignore the stipulation in the
contract, although made in New York, that Danish law would apply in de-
termining the compensation to be awarded to the seaman for injury sustained.
Significantly, the Court pointed out that it 'was cognizant of no public policy
which would dictate a contrary decision.2 In the present case the Florida
statute clearly spelled out the public policy of that state which called for an
application of its own laws. 10
In Ex rel. United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,1, which was relied upon
by the circuit court, it was determined that the overriding interest of the state
of incorporation of a fraternal benefit society in such an organization forbade
the application of the law of the forum.' Apparently, just the fact of incor-
poration of such a society under the laws of a given state results in a sufficient
interest on the part of that state to dictate, absent extraordinary circumstances,
a choice of its laws over those of a foreign forum in determining the rights of
members. It is of special note that Mr. Justice Burton, writing for the majority
in this 5 to 4 decision, distinguished the Hartford case on the ground that
although it involved an insurance contract it did not involve a fraternal benefit
corporation.13
In citing Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.14 the circuit court ap-
parently took little note that there the Supreme Court distinguished the Hart-
ford case and held in favor of applying the lex fori.'; More significant than
the lip service approval given Hartford by the Watson Court is the statement
in the decision that future cases may well warrant a different approach. In
7. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), rehearing denied, 348
U.S. 921 (1955).
S. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
9. State court decisions following Hartford, supra note 6, often note that there is no public
policy which dictates a contrary holding. Mandle v. Kelly, 229 Miss. 327, 9 So. 2d 645
(1956); Buzzone v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 23 N.J. 447, 129 A.2d 561 (1957).
10. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.03 (1943) provides: "No court in this state shall give effect to
any provision or stipulation of the character mentioned in this section."
11. 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
12. Id. at 606.
13. Id. at 608-09.
14. 348 U.S. 66 (1954), rehearing denied, 34S U.S. 921 (1955).
15. In Pink v. AAA. Highway Express, 314 US. 201 (1941), rehearing denied, 314
U.S. 716 (1942), also cited by the circuit court, the Court %.'as likewise in favor of apply-
ing the law of the forum.
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Watson the state government's special relation to insurance matters was the
factor which balanced the interests involved in favor of the law of the juris-
diction in which the issues were being tried at the instance of a citizen of that
state. The factors connecting the state of the forum with the insurance in the
Watson case were of equal weight with those in Hartford, and yet the decision
was contrary.' 6
In addition to those opinions which supposedly support its view, the circuit
court makes note of several others which in fact argue convincingly for a
contrary decision. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen17 reiterates appropriately
to the facts of the present case the well established rule that a state has a
particular interest in the insurance of property within its borders, hence its
power to regulate such matters is expansive.1"
In Hanson v. Denckla'9 we are confronted with a Supreme Court decision
which with its attendant implications casts serious doubt upon the precedent
value of Hartford. In that action to determine the validity of a trust, the
Florida Supreme Court, while holding that although there were insufficient
contacts with that state to allow it to assume jurisdiction over nonresidents,
reasoned that it was unquestionable that had the contacts been sufficient to sus-
tain jurisdiction the law of Florida could have been applied denying the validity
of the trust arrangement. This despite the fact that the agreement was made in
Delaware, and a court of that state had declared it valid according to the
Delaware law. The Court clearly noted that for "choice-of-law purposes" the
Florida court's theory might well apply, but something more was required to
allow the state to extend its jurisdictional arm over nonresidents who had not
been served personally. 20 The conclusion is, therefore, that circumstances
which suffice for jurisdiction can hardly do less for allowing that state to
apply its law in a conflicts situation. With this in mind, then, it is difficult to
see how the majority in the case under consideration can be considered sound
in light of McGee v. The Int'l Life Ins. Co. 21  In the McGee case a
policy of insurance was issued in Texas and mailed to California, from whence
the assured mailed premiums to an out of state office. Relying heavily upon
the state's interest in insurance matters and with a showing of no other con-
nection with the State of California, the Supreme Court held that California
could obtain jurisdiction over the foreign corporation by substituted service.
In the instant case, although the contract was entered into out of the state,
16. In Watson, supra note 14, the insurance policy involved was negotiated in Massachu-
setts and delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois. The contract was between an employer
and his insurance carrier. An employee injured in Louisiana attempted to take advantage of
that state's direct suit statute, and commenced an action against the insurance carrier, despite
a clause in the policy prohibiting such an action. In Hartford, supra note 6, the insurance
agreement was negotiated in Tennessee between two companies doing business there at the
time. The loss occurred in Mississippi, and suit was commenced there.
17. 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
18. Id. at 318.
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1957), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
20. 357 U.S. at 250-53.
21. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the assured and the property which was the subject of the policy subsequently
moved to Florida, where permanent residency was established. The defendant
obviously did business in the state since it was served there. The loss occurred
and was investigated in that jurisdiction. In light of this it would seem that
the requirements of McGee had been met, and the dissent's finding that in
this instance the court can legitimately prefer its own laws even to the extent
of changing obligations under the contract might today be sanctioned by the
United States Supreme Court.
Constitutional Law-Deprivation of Social Security Benefits Under Sec-
tion 202 (n) .- In November of 1955, plaintiff commenced receiving payments
pursuant to the Social Security Act.' On July 7, 1956, plaintiff was deported to
Bulgaria because of his past membership in the Communist Party. - On August
31, 1956, on receiving notice of the deportation from the Attorney General, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare terminated plaintiff's social
security payments. In this action 3 to review the suspension order plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment was granted and the payments reinstated. The
court held that the benefits constituted "accrued property rights," and that
section 202 (n) of the Social Security Act 4 under which plaintiff's benefits were
suspended by reason of his deportation, was violative of due process of law.
Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Social security payments are distributed from the United States Treasury and
are financed by contributions, in the nature of taxes, from both employers and
employees.5 Eligibility for social security benefits depends upon fulfillment of
the three conditions precedent prescribed in the Act.0 In the original Social
1. 70 Stat. 819 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V, 1952).
2. Plaintiff was deported under the authority of Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 241(a), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1958).
3. Plaintiff's action was brought under 53 Stat. 1370-71 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1952), which provides for judicial review of determinations refusing old age insurance
benefits.
4. 70 Stat. 818 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (Supp. V, 1952) provides that no monthly
social security benefits shall be paid to any individual who has been deported under certain
designated sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 US.C.
§ 1251(a) (1958).
5. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 US. 548
(1937); Cain v. United States, 211 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 US. 1013 (1954);
Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 US. 924 (1954);
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1301.
In New York the rights of public employees in a pension system are vested by virtue of
N.Y. Const. art. V, § 7. The constitutional provision prohibits any change in rights
acquired by employees who were members of a pension system as of July 1, 1940. How-
ever, as to future members the legislature can prescribe their rights. Fisher v. State Em-
ployees Retirement Sys., 279 App. Div. 315, 110 N.YS.2d 16 (3d Dep't 1952), affd, 304
N.Y. 899, 110 N.E.2d 733 (1953).
6. "Every individual who-(1) is a fully insured individual . . . (2) has attained
retirement age ... (3) has filed application for old-age insurance benefits or was entitled
to disability insurance benefits for the month preceding the month in which he attained
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Security Act, however, Congress expressly reserved "the right to alter, amend,
or repeal any provision"7 of the Act.
In Steinberg v. United Statess the plaintiff, who was receiving an annuity under
the Civil Service Retirement Act,9 was subpoenaed before a federal grand jury
and pleaded the fifth amendment during the proceeding. His annuity was
then suspended. The court of claims held that even though an annuity is a
gratuity and Congress may revise payments, nevertheless, the "'constitutional
protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.' 110 Judge Whitaker's concur-
ring opinion reasoned that "a Federal employee who has retired from the serv-
ice has a vested right in the retired pay to which he was entitled at the time of
his retirement."'" Judge Whitaker's reasoning was accepted in toto as authority
for the result reached here. But Steinberg is factually distinguishable, since
there an annuity was abrogated after he availed himself of a constitutional
privilege, while in the instant case plaintiff's benefits were terminated after
being deported under a statute the validity of which has withstood constitu.
tional challenge.' 2 Furthermore, Steinberg had been receiving his annuity for
several years prior to the enactment of the statute under which his annuity was
suspended; while section 202 (n) of the Social Security Act,18 which caused
suspension of plaintiff's benefits in the instant case, was enacted and took effect
prior to his becoming eligible to receive such benefits.
It is to be noted that Judge Whitaker, in Steinberg, distinguished between
inchoate rights and payments accrued. The court and indeed a vast preponder-
ance of authorities recognize the right to alter, revise or terminate payment
schedules prior to the time the pensioner commences to receive his benefits.
14
the age of 65, shall be entitled to an old-age insurance benefit. .. ." 70 Stat. 815 (1956), 42
U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. V, 1952).
7. 49 Stat. 648 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1952).
8. 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
9. 62 Stat. 48 (1948), 5 U.S.C. § 691 (1958).
10. 163 F. Supp. at 591, citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
11. 163 F. Supp. at 594. However, Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937),
appears to be directly in conflict with Judge Whitaker's conclusion.
12. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952).
13. 70 Stat. 818 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (Supp. V, 1952).
14. In the leading case of Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889), the Court declared that
until the pension or retirement pay is due, the employee's right is "a mere expectancy
created by the law, and liable to be revoked or destroyed by the same authority." Id. at
471. See Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937); MacLeod v. Fernandez, 101
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 561 (1939). In Roston v. Folsom, 158 F.
Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), the court stated that "social security has the ear marks of a
benefit rather than a right .... It is beyond reason to refer to Social Security benefits as
property rights to which one might succeed." Id. at 120. See Mullowney v. Folsom, 156 F.
Supp. 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). The courts have held that pensions are the bounties of govern-
ment which Congress has the power to grant, revise, withhold, distribute or terminate, in
whole or in part, at its discretion. United States v. Cook, 257 U.S. 523, 527 (1922) ; United
States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1882).
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In fact, a majority allow such action until a particular payment is due. But
here, it is reasoned, once payments commence a property right is acquired by
the pensioner.' 6 If it be a property right, that right obviously cannot be taken
away in a manner inconsistent with the due process clause.' 7 In effect, the
present court infers that deprivation of such a right is patently arbitrary and,
therefore, violative of due process.
There are serious doubts raised by the court's reasoning. First of all, what
difference does it make whether it is called a property right, a contract right
or a gratuity? In any event, Congress lacks the power to grant or withhold
arbitrarily3 If plaintiff's payments were, in other words, suspended pursuant to
an arbitrary enactment of Congress, he has reason to complain about a denial of
due process. At any rate, it seems clear that the plaintiff had complied with
the conditions precedent and had acquired the right to receive payments1
That was in the nature, at least, of a vested right, but a right which was subject
always to reasonable or non-arbitrary modification by Congress. It is non-
essential if this be characterized as a property right, since the due process clause
protects all rights against arbitrary acts. The importance the court places on
the distinctions between the different rights is immaterial and serves only to
becloud the real issues involved. What this court was required to determine
was the reasonableness of the exclusion of deported aliens. However, the ques-
tion of reasonableness was never raised by the court. It simply assumed-
quite arbitrarily-that the exclusion of deportees was unreasonable.
Secondly, the court discussed the possibility that plaintiff's exclusion imposed
a "penalty." The due process clause of the fifth amendment protects property
rights, contract rights and rights of individuals howsoever classified. That this
might be characterized as a "penalty" does not make it the more a violation
of due process. The imposition of a penalty raises necessarily the question as
to the bill of attainder claus0 or the ex post facto clause.2 ' However, the court
15. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937); MIacLeod v. Fernandez, 101
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 30S U.S. 561 (1939); Roston v. Folsom, 158 F. Supp.
112 (E.D N.Y. 1957); Mullowney v. Folsom, 156 F. Supp. 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). Contra,
Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167 (1936); Ewing v. Gardner, 185 F.2d 781 (6th
Cir. 1950). See also United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64 (1832).
16. See note 14 supra.
17. U.S. Const. amend. V.
18. Due process of law means that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. Miaski v. United States, 131 F.2d 614 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 US. 775
(1942). Arbitrary discrimination between persons in similar circumstances is a denial of
due process of law. Wallace v. Currin, 95 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1938), affid, 305 US. 1 (1939).
If the regulation is reasonable in relation to its subject, and is adopted in the interest of
the community, due process of law has been preserved. Smolowe v. DeLendo Corp., 46
F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
19. See note 6 supra.
20. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, ci. 3. "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by
the Constitution." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946).
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, ci. 3.
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did not rely on either clause, perhaps deliberately. Nevertheless, it merits dis-
cussion. A bill of attainder relates to the imposition of criminal punishment
without a judicial trial.2 2 The ex post facto clause refers to a law which alters
or inflicts greater punishment than that existing at the time the act was com-
mitted.23 The determinative factor then is whether the suspension of benefits
provision is penal in nature.24 The court here fails to give an answer. Other
cases are of little value as each set of facts is peculiar unto itself.25 In part
the Social Security Act refers to the deprivation of benefits as a penalty.20
Whether it connotes the same meaning as that intended by the bill of attainder
clause has yet to be determined. Obviously, a Supreme Court decision is neces-
sary as substantial provisions of the Social Security Act, beside the one in issue,
will be effected by whether the deprivation of benefits provision can be con-
strued as a penalty. 27 Whether penal or not, no ex post facto law is here
involved, since at the time plaintiff acquired his right to the benefits the statute
was already in force. Furthermore, Congress reserved the right to alter, amend
or repeal the Act. If Congress acts but does so unreasonably, we should
22. Dodez v. United States, 154 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 338
(1946). See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
23. United States ex rel. Forino v. Garfinkel, 166 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1948). In a
restricted sense ex post facto law is understood to refer only to criminal cases. Buga-
jewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
Ex post facto law applies only to penal legislation. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 936 (1952); United States v. Bize, 86 F. Supp. 939 (D.
Neb. 1949).
24. Deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature and retroactive legislation In
this field is not violate of the ex post facto law. United States ex rel. Barile v. Murff,
116 F. Supp. 163 (D. Md. 1953). Deportation for past membership in the communist
party has been specifically sustained by the Supreme Court. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
25. See, e.g., the following cases involving citizenship and naturalization: Marcello v.
Ahrens, 212 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1954), aff'd sub nom. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302
(1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952); United States v. Mansour,
170 Fed. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); United States v. Chew Cheong, 61 Fed. 200 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
Domestic Relations: Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). Increase in punishment:
Beland v. United States, 128 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676, rehearing
denied, 317 U.S. 710 (1942); United States v. Salzano, 138 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
aff'd, 241 F.2d 849 (1957). Labor Relations: American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d
247 (7th Cir. 1948). Sentence and Parole: Kuczynski v. United States, 145 F.2d 310 (7th
Cir. 1944) ; Chandler v. Johnston, 133 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Story v. Rives, 97 F.2d 182
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 595 (1938). Taxes: Banker Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260
U.S. 647 (1923).
26. 70 Stat. 838 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 402(u)(b) (Supp. V, 1952) provides that "the
court may, in addition to all other penalties provided by law, impose a penalty . . ."
terminating social security payments. This section refers to individuals engaged In
espionage, sabotage or subversive activities.
27. It would adversely affect 70 Stat. 835 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 402(t) (Supp. V, 1952),
which, with certain reservations, requires the suspension of benefits of any alien voluntarily




concern ourselves with the due process clause and not the bill of attainder or
ex post facto clauses.
What the court should have concentrated upon was the issue of reasonable-
ness. It is not lightly to be inferred that Congress has acted arbitrarily. The
purpose of social security was and is to provide for the elderly, lest they become
a financial burden unto themselves and a burden upon the state. Congress
reserved in advance the right to modify the Act. Congress could exclude all
nonresident aliens from social security benefits.28 Obviously, the exclusion would
be reasonable and consistent with the prime purpose of the Act. But
Congress chose not to exclude all non-residents, or even all deportees, but only
certain classes of deportees.29 Is this an arbitrary classification? That question
required explanation as well as an answer. The court here gave an answer.
Unfortunately, it gave no explanation.
Defamation-Publication of Defamatory Statements Made By United
States Senator At Press Conference Is Qualifiedly Privileged.-Plaintiff,
a radar scientist, brought a libel action against the Newark Star-Ledger for pub-
lishing articles containing allegedly defamatory statements made by a United
States Senator. The Senator's statements concerning the plaintiff were made
during press conferences held subsequent to Senate investigating committee
hearings.' Pending appeal to the appellate division of the superior court from
a judgment entered upon a jury verdict for the defendants, the case was brought
before the New Jersey Supreme Court by its certification, sua sponte. The
court, Chief Justice Weintraub dissenting in part, affirmed. A United States
Senator has a qualified privilege to disclose, and a newspaper has a qualified
privilege to report, defamatory charges made at legislative committee hearings,
private or public. Coleum v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 149
A.2d 193 (1959).
28. Congress differentiated between deported aliens and those who voluntarily absent
themselves from the United States. The former are covered by 70 Stat. 818 (1956), 42
U.S.C. § 402(n) (Supp. V, 1952), which provides for immediate suspension in certain
cases, while the latter are covered by 70 Stat. 835 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 402(t) (Supp. V.
1952). See note 27 supra.
29. The deportees whose benefits are suspended were characterized by HR. Rep. No.
1698, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1953), as those involving "deportation because of unlawful
entry, conviction of a crime, or subversive activity." Of the eighteen grounds for de-
portation provided in 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1958), fourteen are cited in
70 Stat. 818 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (Supp. V, 1952). Whether this is an arbitrary
distinction between different classes of deportees was not discussed by the present court.
1. At the first press conference, Senator McCarthy, who alone constituted at the time
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, issued statements pertaining to testimony given at an executive or dosed
session of the Subcommittee which linked the plaintiff with a convicted atom spy. At a
later conference, the Senator accused the plaintiff of having rendered perjurious testimony at
a public hearing. 29 N.J. 357, 367-71, 149 A.2d 193, 193-99 (1959). While unanimously
upholding the privileged nature of the second press conference, the Court differed as to the
status of the first.
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The Federal Constitution gives members of Congress an absolute immunity
for statements made during speeches or debates in either House.2 This legisla-
tive immunity, of English origin,3 has also been accorded state legislators by
virtue of constitutional provision, legislative enactment or as part of accepted
common law. 4 Federal and state courts have liberally construed the constitu-
tional immunity, 5 and have extended its protection to defamatory statements
2. "The Senators and Representatives . . . for any Speech or Debate in either House . . .
shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. "In origin, the
privilege was less concerned with civil redress for defamation than with criminal prosecution
for sedition, an area of the law with which the constitutional fathers had accumulated a
considerable experience as colonists under British rule." Editorial, A License to Defame, 82
N.J.L.J. 348 (1959).
Wilson staunchly defended legislative immunity as imperative for an unfettered function-
ing of representative democracy. He argued that "in order to enable and encourage a repre-
sentative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is Indis-
pensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should
be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise
of that liberty may occasion offence." 2 Works of James Wilson 38 (Andrews ed. 1896).
3. Legislative immunity was the culmination of a prolonged power struggle between
Parliament and the Crown which guaranteed freedom of debate without the threat of royal
interference or recrimination. For an excellent summary of the English background of the
privilege see Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceed-
ings, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 131, 132-34 (1910). As was noted by Mr. Justice Story, "the next
great and vital privilege is the freedom of speech and debate, without which all other
privileges would be comparatively unimportant or ineffectual. This privilege, also, is derived
from the practice of the British Parliament, and was in full exercise in our colonial legis-
latures, and now belongs to the legislature of every State in the Union as matter of consti-
tutional right." 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 866 (5th ed. 1891).
4. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope,
99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 960, 966 (1951). See 30 Neb. L. Rev. 107, 108 n.3 (1951), for a list of
those states providing constitutional guarantees for legislative immunity. Most of the state
provisions employ the same language as that found in the Federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, para. 8. See also Cole v. Richards, 108 N.J.L. 356, 158 Atd. 466
(Ct. Err. & App. 1932) (slanderous statements made on the floor by state senator). Mem-
bers of minor legislative bodies, such as city councils, possess only a qualified privilege.
See, e.g., Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954); Ivie v. Minton, 75 Ore.
483, 147 Pac. 395 (1915).
5. In the celebrated case of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 1 (1808), Chief Justice
Parsons delineated the latitude afforded legislators by virtue of their constitutional im-
munity: "I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally,
that the full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion,
uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a . . .
written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of
the office; and I would define the article as securing to every member exemption from
prosecution, for every thing said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the
functions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to
the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules. I do not confine the member to
his place in the house; and I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled to this
privilege, when not within the walls of the representatives' chamber." Id. at 27. The
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made off the floor during committee hearings and congressional investigations,
which today comprise the greater bulk of legislative activity. This immunity is
grounded in the argument that legislators must be allowed to discharge the
duties of their office through free and unfettered discussions, insulated from
the fear of legal harassment or interference on the part of those who may be
affected by legislative action. Yet, it has been suggested that this purpose
could still be served, and the rights of the individual protected, by granting a
qualified privilege8 or by permitting persons defamed by a member of Congress
to sue the United States Government.9
The courts have declined to find an absolute privilege immunizing members
of Congress from liability for defamatory statements made beyond the confines
of the House and the committee rooms.' 0 Neither is there an absolute privilege
in a legislator's off-the-floor repetition or republication of defamatory remarks
originally made within the protective scope of his legislative function. 1
Coffin case, supra, was subsequently praised by the United States Supreme Court as "per-
haps, the most authoritative case in this country on the construction of the provision in
regard to freedom of debate in legislative bodies, and being so early after the formation of
the Constitution of the United States, is of much weight." Kilbourn v. Thompcon, 103
U.S. 168, 204 (1880). The Court reaffirmed the breadth of legislative activity encompassed
within the constitutional immunity. "The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application
to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which,
though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is
done vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to things generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." Id. at
204 (dictum). See also Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
6. Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J. Misc. 37, 56 A.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1948). As the court
noted: "These alleged [defamatory] statements were made by the defendant while a
member of the General Assembly before a duly constituted judiciary Committee of raid
General Assembly in the performance of his duties as an Asemblyman, and therefore, be
enjoyed the constitutional privilege granted to a member of the General Assembly and
Legislature" Id. at 41, 56 A.2d at 614.
7. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Kilbourn v. Thomps-on, 103
U.S. 16S (lSS0); Congressional Investigations: Defamation Immunity, 18 U. ChL L. Rev.
591 (1951). An absolute privilege is also enjoyed by counsel and witnesses testifying at a
legislative hearing. See, e.g., Kelly v. Daro, 47 Cal. App. 2d 418, 118 P.2d 37 (1941). See
also 33 Am. Jur. Libel and Slander § 142 (1941).
S. See, e.g., Field, The Constitutional Privileges of Legislators, 9 Minn. L. Rev. 442
(1925). Field maintains that a "conditional privilege allows the legislator all the freedom
of debate which is of any benefit to representative government, and the interest of the indi-
vidual in preserving his reputation is of sufficient importance to warrant the doctrine of a
conditional privilege, that he may retain some measure of protection from defamation by
a legislator . . . " Id. at 445-46.
9. Yanklwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope,
99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 960, 974 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Cole v. Richards, 108 N.J.L. 356, 158 Ad. 466 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932). See
also Congressional Investigations: Defamation Immunity, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1951).
11. In Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 293 U.S. 76
(1934), a United States Senator had reprinted and distributed to persons in Louisiana
copies of the Congressional Record containing a defamatory speech he had delivered on
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At common law there was no privilege for the reprinting of legislative pro-
ceedings containing defamatory matter,' 2 although the existence of a qualified
privilege to report judicial proceedings had been acknowledged in Rex v.
Wright,13 despite judicial cognizance of the attendant notoriety thus attached
to private litigation.' 4 In Stockdale v. Hansard5 the defendant publisher was
held liable for printing a libelous parliamentary report, although he had been
ordered by the House of Commons to publish all parliamentary reports.
Alarmed over this decision, Parliament enacted the Parliamentary Papers
Act,' 6 which granted a stay of proceedings to those publishing parliamentary
papers under the direct authority of that body.'7
Not until the English case of Wason v. Walter,'8 in 1868, was the voluntary
publication of parliamentary proceedings vested with a privileged character.
The Wason court held that an accurate newspaper report of a parliamentary
debate enjoyed a qualified privilege, and for the first time equated newspaper
reporting of legislative proceedings with those of judicial proceedings."0 Public
interest in the affairs and functions of Parliament was cited in justification of
this judicial innovation. 20
In the United States it is generally recognized that newspapers have a quali-
fied privilege to publish fair and accurate reports of official proceedings when
the reporting is made in good faith.21 The press is also entitled to "fair
comment ' 22 with regard to the matters treated. There must be some indication
the Senate floor. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the con-
stitutional exemption of members of Congress from arrest did not preclude service of legal
process. In a strong dictum, the court declared that had the Senator proffered the defense
of absolute immunity for his speech which had been originally made on the Senate floor,
the defense would be without force, for while the "published articles were in part repro-
ductions of the speech, the offense consists not in what was said in the Senate, but in the
publication and circularizing of the libelous documents." 69 F.2d at 389.
12. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 376-77 (1926).
13. 8 T.R. 293, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396 (K.B. 1799).
14. The court acknowledged that "the publication of such proceedings may be to the
disadvantage of the particular individual concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the
public that the proceedings of Courts of Justice should be universally known. The general
advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public, more than counter-
balances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of
such proceedings." Id. at 298, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1399.
15. 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839).
16. 1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9.
17. See Ball, The Law of Libel as Affecting Newspapers and Journalists 71-72 (1912).
18. L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868).
19. Ball, op. cit. supra note 17, at 107.
20. Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, 82 (1868).
21. See, e.g., Bank v. Goodwin, 148 Mo. App. 364, 128 S.W. 220 (1910). See also 33
Am. Jur. Libel and Slander § 158 (1941); Restatement, Torts § 611 (1938); Note, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 875, 928 (1956).
22. "In a word, 'fair comment' (a) must be based on facts truly stated, and (b) must
not contain imputations of corrupt or dishonourable motives on the person whose conduct
or work is criticized, save in so far as such imputations are warranted by the facts, and
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that the newspaper report is an account of a governmental proceeding, other-
wise the privilege will be forfeited.23 Press reports of legislative proceedings,
therefore, whether held in plenary session or in committee, are qualifiedly
privileged, although incorporating therein libelous material2 4
In the instant case, the defendant newspaper claimed a qualified privilege
on the ground that its articles pertaining to revelations made at an executive
session constituted a report of a legislative proceeding, since Senator McCarthy's
remarks were the best evidence, in the absence of any available transcript, of
what had transpired before the Subcommittee. -5 Moreover, it was asserted
that in speaking to the press the Senator was acting in an official capacity, as
the Subcommittee itself, pro hac vice, informing the public of the results of an
investigation committed to his supervision, and hence was himself privilegedY0
In accepting these arguments, the majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court
thus extended to the Senator a qualified privilege, viewing the revelations made
at the press conferences as an authorized committee publication of the execu-
tive hearings.27 The court held that it was within the discretion of the Sub-
committee to release such information as it believed related to the general
good.2s The fact that the information was acquired in the course of a closed
or executive hearing was deemed not to exclude communication to the public
of matters affecting internal security and defense or other areas of legitimate
public concern.29 While cognizant of the possible harm that such privileged
public communication might inflict upon individual reputations, the court
argued that to disregard the exigencies of the "collective interest" would
"plainly subvert the imperative principle and policy of privilege in the service
of the essential public welfare." 30 Since Senator McCarthy was privileged in
(c) must be the honest expression of the writer's real opinion; and if the comment complies
with these conditions, it is fair comment, however incorrect be the views exprezsed by the
critic, or however exaggerated or even prejudiced be the language of the criticism . . .
Leers v. Green, 24 N.J. 239, 254-55, 131 A.2d 781, 789 (1957).
23. Hughes v. Washington Daily News Co., 193 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See alo
Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 929 (1956).
24. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 126 (1948). See also Annot., 155 A.L.R. 1346, 134S
(1945) ; Prosser, Torts § 95, at 623 (2d ed. 1955).
25. Brief for Respondents, p. 20.
26. Id. at 22.
27. 29 N.J. at 381, 149 A.2d at 206. Evidence of the Committee's authorization stood
uncontroverted at the trial. Ibid. See also Brief for Respondents, p. 22.
28. 29 N.J. at 381, 149 A.2d at 205-06.
29. "It cannot be that evidence adduced and information acquired in the coume of an
executive session of a congressional investigating committee are sealed against public dis-
closure for all time save as unprivileged communications subjecting the members of the
committee to the risk of suit and personal civil liability for libel and slander and the like,
even though the publications are made in what the committee conceived to be the interest
of internal security and defense or other public exigency or matter of legitimate common




speaking to the press, the defendant newspaper was also qualifiedly privileged
in publishing his statements. 31
Sharply disagreeing with his associates, Chief Justice Weintraub asserted
that there should be no privilege to report a secret proceeding.82 Terming the
majority's position as "an invitation to irresponsibility, 3 3 he proposed that if
public interest dictated the disclosure of testimony given at a secret or closed
hearing, then the whole record, rather than a summary or mere excerpts, should
be released for public scrutiny.34 Since Senator McCarthy's statements were
devoid of any privileged status, Weintraub concluded, a newspaper could
assert no privilege on its part in disseminating an unprivileged communication. 5
The instant decision, in effect, accords for the first time a limited privilege
to official press conferences reporting on matters discussed during a closed
session of a legislative investigating committee. This appears to be a reason-
able extension of the privilege. The court has at once localized the immunity
possessed by the legislator, rendering him liable for any abuse of his condi-
tional privilege,3 6 and fostered public communication of information considered
to be of public interest. At the same time the individual right to redress for
31. "The 'instruments of communication, such as the newspaper, are themselves privi-
leged to aid in the publication, wherever the privilege in fact exists.'" Id. at 380, 149 A.2d
at 205. New Jersey grants the press a statutory qualified privilege to report "official
statements issued by police department heads, county prosecutors and coroners in investiga-
tions in progress or completed by them." N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2a:43-1 (1952). This extension
of the privileged character accorded publication of judicial proceedings was strictly con-
strued in Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869 (1949), to apply only to
sta,-ments issued by the heads of the respective departments and not to those issued by
subordinates.
32. Id. at 387, 149 A.2d at 209 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 388, 149 A.2d at 209.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. Chief Justice Weintraub argued that "to extend ... [constitutional immunity]
on either an absolute or qualified basis to press conferences held by legislators, and to boot,
where the hearing was and remains secret, is, in my view, a disservice to society. It being
wholly unnecessary for the legislative function, the extension is a needless waste of human
rights and can only serve to aggravate the already troublesome problem of trial by publica-
tion." Id. at 392, 149 A.2d at 211.
36. See King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 421, 9 At]. 705, 707 (Ct. Err. & App. 1887),
where the court maintained that while a subject may be privileged, "a communication on
that subject [may] be unprivileged if the restraints and qualifications imposed by law upon
the publicity to be given the communication be not observed." Actual malice is needed to
destroy a qualified privilege, as distinguished from legal or constructive malice which the
law infers from the unjustifiable publication of defamatory material. See Prosser, Torts § 95,
at 625-29 (2d ed. 1955) ; Harper & James, Torts § 5.27, at 450-56 (1956). See also Re-
statement, Torts §§ 599-605 (1938).
"Unlike an absolute privilege, a qualified privilege can be lost by abuse on the part of
the defendant. Generally speaking, he must not say more or communicate to a larger
audience than is reasonably necessary to serve a socially desirable purpose, must have
reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of what he says, and must not be actuated by
an improper motive." Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 924 (1956).
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defamation is protected. The decision is a welcome deviation from the current
judicial trend of liberalizing the absolute privilege granted governmental exec-
utive officials with regard to defamatory press releases, as exemplified by the
recent Supreme Court decision in Barr v. Matteo. 7
Evidence - Admissibility of Conviction of Traffic Offense in Subsequent
Civil Action.-Upon trial, the court refused to admit into evidence, as proba-
tive of defendant's negligence, his conviction for a traffic violation arising
from the same circumstances. The supreme court denied plaintiffs motion for
an order setting aside the verdict in favor of defendant and held that a con-
viction for a traffic infraction is inadmissible as substantive evidence in a civil
action. Ando v. Woodberry, 15 'Misc. 2d 774, 181 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
The few decisions in New York concerning the admissibility of a conviction
for a traffic infraction as evidence in a civil action reflect the confusion sur-
rounding the issue. By statute in New York a traffic infraction is not a crime,
and is not admissible in evidence merely to challenge the credibility of the
witness.1 However, the statute does not affect the admissibility of such evi-
dence when offered for other purposes? For these situations, the courts have
considered certain general principles as determinative of admissibility.
Where the convicted party is seeking affirmative relief the court will not
37. 358 U.S. 917 (1959). This case has an interesting history. A verdict for the
plaintiff had been returned against the defendant, the acting director of rent stabilization,
in the trial court. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that since the press
release went beyond the defendant's line of duty, the absolute privilege claimed by the
defendant, even if assumed available, did not attach. 244 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the court of appeals judgment, remanding
the case with directions to "pass upon petitioner's claim of a qualified privilege." 355 U.S.
171, 173 (1957). On remand, the court of appeals found that the press release did enjoy a
qualified privilege, but held there was sufficient evidence from which a jury might
reasonably find that the privilege was forfeited; the case vas therefore remanded to the
district court for retrial. 256 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The Supreme Court again
granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's contention that his claim of an absolute
privilege precluded the maintenance of the suit despite allegations of actual malice. In
holding that the petitioner, acting director of rent stabilization, did enjoy an absolute
privilege, a sharply divided Court declared that the "complexities and magnitude of gov-
ernmental activity have become so great that there must of necessity be a delegation and
redelegation of authority as to many functions, and we cannot say that these functions
become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of lower rank in the
executive hierarchy." 35S U.S. at 922.
1. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 2(29). N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 355 provides in part that
no "witness [shall] be required to disclose a conviction for a traffic infraction, as defined
by the vehicle and traffic law nor shall conviction therefor affect the credibility of such
witness in any action or proceeding."
2. But see N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 392(a) which provides: "A pleading in a civil action
cannot be used in a criminal prosecution against the party, as proof of a fact admitted or
alleged therein.'
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hesitate to admit his prior conviction arising out of the same set of facts.3 In
such a case, the court will permit proof of the conviction as prima facie evi-
dence of the facts involved against the civil action plaintiff, reasoning that
"one may not profit by his own wrongdoing, and may not maintain an action
to which he must trace his title through his own breach of the law. .... ,.4
The type and gravity of the offense of which the defendant has been con-
victed is a determinative factor of admissibility. While there is no consistency
in the cases, it seems likely that the more serious the offense the greater are
the chances of the admissibility of the conviction. Illustrative of this fact
traffic infractions, the least serious of violations, are seldom admitted in evi-
dence in a subsequent trial.0
Where, as in the instant case, the conviction of a traffic infraction is based
on a plea of guilty this factor may tend to increase the admissibility of evi-
dence of the conviction as evidence.7 It is not clear in this case whether admis-
sibility of the evidence is due to a belief that the plea of guilty increases the
probative value of the conviction,8 or that the plea itself is admissible as an
informal judicial admission.9 Without specifying whether the conviction, or
the plea, or both, was being offered in evidence, the court in the present case
rested its decision against admissibility, at least in part, on the conclusion that
3. Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932). Accord, Everdyke
v. Esley, 258 App. Div. 843, 15 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1st Dep't 1939). See also In re Recht-
schaffen's Estate, 278 N.Y. 336, 16 N.E.2d 357 (1938); Giessler v. Accurate Brass Co.,
271 App. Div. 980, 68 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1947); Roach v. Yonkers Ry., 242 App. Div.
195, 271 N.Y. Supp. 289 (2d Dep't 1934).
4. Roach v. Yonkers Ry., 242 App. Div. 195, 197, 271 N.Y. Supp. 289, 292 (2d Dep't
1934).
5. Holding such evidence admissible: Hart v. Mealey, 287 N.Y. 39, 38 N.E.2d 121
(1941) ; McDowell v. Birchett, 126 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1953). Against admissibility:
Sims v. Union News Co., 284 App. Div. 335, 131 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dep't 1954); Walther
v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1949); See v.
Wormser, 129 App. Div. 596, 113 N.Y.S. 1093 (2d Dep't 1908); Loeper v. Roberts, 199
Misc. 1095, 106 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
6. See note 1 supra; Sims v. Union News Co., 284 App. Div. 335, 131 N.Y.S.2d 837
(1st Dep't 1954).
7. Stanton v. Major, 274 App. Div. 864, 82 N.Y.S.2d 134 (3d Dep't 1948); Same v.
Davison, 253 App. Div. 123, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (4th Dep't 1937); Markett v. Gemke, 154
N.Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1915). Contra, Max v. Brookhaven Dev. Co., 262 App. Div. 907,
28 N.Y.S.2d 845 (2d Dep't 1941); Michitsch v. Stimfel, 7 Misc. 2d 960, 164 N.Y.S.2d 246
(Sup. Ct. 1957).
8. This would seem to be inferred in the instant case. 15 Misc. 2d at 775, 181 N.Y.S.2d
at 906.
9. The court does not seem, in the instant case, to have considered such a proposition.
However, some other jurisdictions have held that all such evidence of a conviction of a
traffic infraction is inadmissible, except where it is introduced for the primary purpose of
showing that a present position is inconsistent with a former contention. See Breitenbach v.
Trowbridge, 64 Mich. 393, 31 N.W. 402 (1887); Spain v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay.
Co., 78 Or. 355, 153 Pac. 470 (1915) ; Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va.
156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922). Contra, Morrissey v. Powell, 304 Mass. 268, 23 N.E.2d 411 (1939);
2 Freeman, Judgements § 653 (5th ed. 1925).
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the probative value of evidence of the prior conviction for violation of a traffic
infraction was small, since it is known that a guilty plea in minor offenses may
be made as a matter of convenience to the defendant, rather than as a true
admission of guilt. It is suggested, however, that since this practice is so uni-
versally known and accepted, the better procedure would be to admit the
evidence and leave the determination of its weight to the jury.
In addition to refusing to admit the evidence on the basis of lack of probative
value, the court held the evidence of the prior conviction of a traffic infraction
inadmissible due to its prejudicial nature.10 It would seem, however, that any
possible prejudicial effect of such evidence on the jury could be counteracted
by the awareness of the jury of the facts surrounding such a conviction.
Furthermore, as such evidence is no more than prima facie proof of the facts,
the convicted party may explain to the satisfaction of the jury the factors
which caused the conviction and motivated the plea, if any. Therefore, it
would appear that both objections of the court in the principal case might be
overcome by admission of the evidence under proper instructions.
The clear trend of the courts today is toward more general admissibility,'
based on the individual facts of the specific case. Where all the relevant
factors have been considered, it is urged that admission should not be de-
nied solely because the offense is of lesser gravity, but that, absent clear
legislative direction, the evidence should be admitted and considered by the
jury, with whatever importance they may, from their own experience, place
on it.
Evidence-Admissibility of Exculpatory Statements Obtained During
Illegal Detention.-The defendant, whose principal defense was insanity,
was found guilty of second degree murder. An exculpatory statement
obtained nine hours after defendant's arrest and prior to the time he was
brought before a committing magistrate was admitted in evidence for the sole
purpose of showing his sanity at the time of the arrest. The court of appeals,
four judges dissenting, sustained the district court's conviction.' The court held
10. 15 Misc. at 775, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
11. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.
1941); Willson v. Manhattan Ry., 2 Misc. 127, 20 N.Y. Supp. 852 (C.P. 1892), afi'd
on opinion below, 144 N.Y. 632, 39 N.E. 495 (1894). Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 33
Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1952), specifically permits a criminal judgement rendercd
under the antitrust laws to be prima fade evidence against the defendant in a subsequent
civil action. Model Code of Evidence, rule 521 (1942), provides: "Evidence of a zubsisting
judgement adjudging a person guilty of a crime or a misdemeanor is admissible as tending
to prove the facts recited therein and every fact essential to sustain the judgement." See
also Annot., 31 A.L.R. 261 (1924); Annot., IS A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951); Cowen, The Ad-
missibility of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil Proceedings, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 225
(1952); Comment, S0 Yale LJ. 499 (1941); Note, 39 Va. L. Rev. 995 (1953).
1. A possible ground for reversal discussed by the court was the trial judge's charge to
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that error, if any, in the admission of exculpatory statements obtained during
an illegal detention was not prejudicial as other substantial evidence existed
from which the jury could conclude that the accused was sane at the time of the
crime. Starr v. United States, 264 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 936 (1959).
Rule 5 (a) of the federal criminal procedure provides that arrested parties are
to be brought before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay.2 The
failure to observe the above rule brings into play the doctrine promulgated in
the series of Supreme Court cases from McNabb v. United States3 to Mallory
the jury wherein he said: "'In the event your verdict is not guilty by reason of insanity,
the defendant will be committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital, there to remain until such time
as it is established that he is no longer insane.'" Starr v. United States, 264 F.2d at 382.
Error was assigned to the omission in the charge concerning public safety, since a person
who is free from mental illness cannot be confined in an institution merely because he is
potentially dangerous. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 961 (1958), provided that when instruction is given the jury as to the effect of a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity the jury should simply be informed that such
verdict means that the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the
superintendent has certified and the court is satisfied that the individual has recovered his
sanity, and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, in which
event, and at which time, the court shall order his release either unconditionally or under
such conditions as the court may see fit. 254 F.2d at 728. The majority concluded that the
instructions in the instant case were not prejudicial as the public safety element is implied
in the charge. Furthermore, the majority said the Lyles case, supra, was prospective in ap-
plication. The minority pointed out that the public safety element has been necessary since
Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955), held that when an accused has
pleaded insanity, the judge should inform the jury that if he be acquitted by reason of in-
sanity he will be confined in an institution for the insane as long as public safety and wel-
fare require. 222 F.2d at 404. In fact, Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir.
1957), expressly declared that where an insanity defense is fairly raised the failure to Inform
the jury of the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity constituted
error. 251 F.2d at 369.
2. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
3. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The MciNabb Court held that incriminating statements obtained
from the accused during an illegal detention after arrest and before arraignment were
inadmissible in federal courts and conviction based thereon must be set aside. 318 U.S. at
347. The McNabb rule caused confusion in the lower courts as to whether illegal detention
alone invokes the exclusionary rule of McNabb, or whether it is merely another element to
consider in determining the voluntariness of the confession. See, e.g., United States v.
Grote, 140 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Runnels v. United States, 138 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1943) ;
United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1943). In Mitchell v. United States, 322
U.S. 65 (1944), a confession was admitted in evidence though the accused was not promptly
arraigned, and the conviction was not reversed. This case is distinguishable, however, since
the incriminating statements were found to have been made before any illegal de-
tention occurred. In Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948), a confession obtained
during an illegal detention was held inadmissible and the conviction was set aside. But
this case also left the same problem that existed after McNabb, supra, unresolved. See note
4 infra.
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v. United States.4 Though conflicting interpretations of the rule exist, it can
be clearly enunciated that incriminating statements elicited from an accused
during a period of unlawful detention are inadmissible, and a conviction resting
upon such evidence must be set aside. The purpose of such a rule is to prevent
individuals from being subjected to coercive and unfair treatment by rendering
it impracticable for law enforcement agencies to resort to tactics violative of
an individual's fundamental rights.0
The initial view expressed by the court in the instant case is that the Mallory
rule excludes only incriminating statements obtained during an illegal detention
of the accused. Therefore, reasoned the court, the rule is inapplicable here as
defendant's statements were not incriminatory, but dearly exculpatory. The
court reasoned that "the rules governing the reception in evidence of such ad-
missions [exculpatory statements] are much less onerous than those concerning
confessions."17 The majority's position was complicated by the United States
Supreme Court decision of Opper v. United States,8 which involved the question
of whether exculpatory statements require corroboration as do incriminating
statements. The Opper Court declared: "We conclude that exculpatory state-
ments... may not differ from other admissions of incriminating facts. Given
when the accused is under suspicion, they become questionable just as testimony
by witnesses to other extrajudicial statements of the accused. ' * The majority
attempted to distinguish Opper by reasoning that the case merely applied to
exculpatory statements which denied guilt but admitted facts essential to the
crime charged. Here the statements were introduced in evidence merely to
show the conduct of the accused shortly after the crime occurred.
The court's reasoning is dubious. As the minority pointed out: "[S]anity,
once placed in issue, as it was here, becomes an 'element necessary to constitute
the crime' and the defendant cannot be declared guilty of the crime unless the
Government proves his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, just as it must with
respect to every other element of the crime . . . . Evidence tending to prove
sanity is, therefore, incriminating evidence in the circumstances here."10
Realizing that their contentions were susceptible to argument, the majority
hedged, and concluded that even if the Mallory opinion were construed to hold
4. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The Mallory Court dearly held that unlawful delay alone re-
quired exclusion. However, the problem as to what constitutes unnecessary delay remains
in controversy. For the aftermath of Mallory see, e.g., Morse v. United States, 256 F.2d
280 (5th Cir. 195S); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 60S, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Metoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1957); ratson v. United States, 249
F2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Accord, Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise,
Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. LJ. 1 (1958); Comment, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 396 (195S);
Comment, 68 Yale LJ. 1003 (1959).
5. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
6. Mallory v. United States, 354 US. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United States, 335 US.
410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
7. Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d 354, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
8. 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
9. Id. at 92.
10. 264 F.2d at 384 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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inadmissible an exculpatory statement taken during an unnecessary delay in
arraignment, nevertheless, the error was nonprejudicial."1 The court contended
that the Mallory holding necessitated a finding of prejudice since the statements
there were incriminating. But, the court reasoned, the statements here were not
incriminating and also not prejudicial. Thus, the court deemed it proper to
apply the harmless error rule, which provides that any error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. 12 The
harmless error rule was enacted by Congress because courts of review had come
to "'tower above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of tech-
nicality.' "13 It destroyed the presumption often indulged in by the courts
"that error being shown, prejudice must be presumed,"' 4 and established "the
more reasonable rule that if, upon an examination of the entire record, sub-
stantial prejudice does not appear, the error must be regarded as harmless."'15
The determinative factor then is whether the wrongful admission of the
exculpatory statements obtained from the defendant during an illegal detention
is a mere technicality, not substantially prejudicing the rights of the accused.
Sanity was the issue here. The statements related to defendant's sanity at the
time of the commission of the crime. The prosecution had the burden of proving
sanity.'8 Certainly the statements, though exculpatory, were incriminating, and
being incriminating were prejudicial. No doubt exists that they reflect on the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. The capacity in law of the accused to
commit the crime is essential to a guilty verdict.' 7 The fact that there was sub-
stantial independent evidence of defendant's sanity at the time the crime was
committed does not detract from the possibility that the jury placed substantial
reliance on the statements by the accused. The harmless error rule would seem
to have been misused here.
The court was willing to extend the Mallory rule to exculpatory statements
obtained during an illegal detention. Nevertheless, if such statements are
admitted in evidence, the court contends it is necessary to apply the harmless
error rule where such statements are, as here, nonprejudicial. The prime purpose
of Mallory was to protect the individual from overzealous law enforcement.
However, there does not appear to be much danger of this in the present case
since the statements were exculpatory in nature when elicited and did not take
on their incriminatory character until the accused pleaded insanity as a de-
fense. An extension of the rule would certainly not be in accord with the spirit
of the McNabb and Mallory cases.
11. Id. at 380.
12. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
13. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946).
14. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935).
15. Id. at 82.
16. "If the whole evidence . .. does not exclude beyond reasonable doubt the hypothesis
of insanity, of which some proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an acquittal . .. .
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895).
17. Ibid.
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Insurance-Admissibility of Evidence To Determine Amount of Recovery
on Fire Policy.-Plaintiff, a lessee of vacant land under a year to year tenancy
terminable upon thirty days notice by the lessor, erected a building on the
leased land at his own expense. The lease gave plaintiff the right to remove
this building within five days after notice of termination of the lease. In the
event of failure to remove the building was to become the property of the
lessor. The plaintiff took out fire insurance on the building from the defendant
insurance company. Subsequently, the lessor served notice on the plaintiff to
remove, and, after a summary proceeding to dispossess, a final order and war-
rant were served on the plaintiff. Thereafter, the building vas completely
destroyed by fire. In an action by the plaintiff-insured to recover the full value
of the building under the policy which limited recovery "in no event for more
than the interest of the insured," the appellate division held that evidence of
the plaintiff's tenancy, the dispossess order and plaintiff's subsequent plans to
destroy the building was admissible to show whether the plaintiff had any
insurable interest in the building at the time of the fire, but was not admissible
as affecting the amount of plaintiff's recovery under the quoted provision in
the policy. Federowicz v. Potomac Ins. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 330, 183 N.Y.S.2d
115 (4th Dep't 1959).
A contract of fire insurance is personal to the insured' and is one of indemnity
against loss.2 The insurance company bargains to reimburse the insured for
any loss of interest caused by destruction by fire of the subject of the in-
surance.3 If there is to be a recovery, it is necessary for the insured to have an
insurable interest in the subject matter at the time of loss.4 Hence, in the instant
case the court properly ruled that evidence tending to prove that at the time of
the fire the insured had forfeited his interest in the building to the lessor, was
admissible, since if the insured's interest was extinguished he could not recover.5
Assuming that the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the building, the greater
question in the principal case is whether the facts of the tenancy and of the
insured's intention to destroy the building should be admissible as affecting the
amount of plaintiff's recovery. The court held this evidence inadmissible for
this purpose on the ground that the clause limiting recovery in no event for
more than the interest of the insured contemplated a situation where the insured
has a limited interest G and, since the interest here was not limited but absolute,7
recovery should be for full value. The policy, it said, was not one of indemnity
against financial loss but was insurance against physical loss. Once it can be
shown that the insured has an insurable interest, "the triers of the fact should
1. 4 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 2107 (1941).
2. McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 181, 159 N.E. 9D2, 903 (1928);
1 Richards, Insurance §§ 64, 153 (5th ed. 1952).
3. 1 Richards, Insurance § 64 (5th ed. 1952).
4. Id. § 6S. See also Foley v. The Mfr's & Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46
N.E. 318 (1S97).
5. 4 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 2241 (1941).
6. 7 App. Div. 2d 330, 336, 183 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (4th Dep't 1959).
7. Id. at 336, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
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not be permitted to speculate as to the extent of his financial loss by the
remoteness or imminence of the termination of his insurable interest."8
The clause, "nor in any event for more than the interest of the insured," first
appeared in New York in the revised standard policy of 1943.0 Prior to this,
a fire policy could be voided in either of two situations: (1) if the interest of
the insured was other than unconditional and sole ownership, or (2) if the
subject of the insurance was a building on ground not owned by the insured in
fee simple.10 These clauses were eliminated in the 1943 revision, and the above
clause was added. The court in the principal case reasoning that the insured's
interest was not limited but absolute, construed the latter clause as applying
to a situation envisaged by the first voiding clause, that is, where the insured
was not the sole and unconditional owner. The clause does not limit recovery
when the insured comes under the second situation, i.e., where he owns a build-
ing on land not owned by him. It is not too unreasonable to conclude that
when the standard fire policy was revised, the "interest" referred to in the
addition was the "interest" encompassed in the deleted clauses, namely, what
will be referred to herein as partial and limited interest, respectively." Hence,
the revision was intended to give the insurance company protection for those
situations which, before the revision, warranted a voiding of the policy. This
logic is more compelling in view of the intrinsic nature of fire insurance, namely,
that of indemnification against financial loss.
The insurance company merely promises to indemnify the insured to
the extent of his insurable interest in the subject matter at the time
of loss, and it is not unreasonable for the companies to limit re-
covery to the extent of this interest. New York cases, however, both
before and after the 1943 revision, have been inclined to depart from the in-
demnity principle in certain cases, and grant full recovery regardless of actual
financial loss.1 2 Where the insured-lessee has a contract with a third party
8. Ibid.
9. N.Y. Ins. Law § 168.
10. N.Y. Sess. Law 1917, ch. 440, § 121.
11. In stating that the interest of the plaintiff was not limited but absolute, the court, in
the instant case, seems to apply the phrase "limited interest" to the situation covered in the
first "moral hazard" clause, i.e., where the insured is other than a sole or unconditional
owner. Perhaps the classification of such an insured as a partial owner, and the use of the
phrase "limited interest" in connection with a lessee who owns property on leased hand, is
a more proper distinction.
12. Whereas the true nature of indemnity insurance is to reimburse the insured to the
extent of his financial loss, the insured has been given recovery even where he has in fact
suffered no financial loss. 1 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 27 (1929). This has been
done in cases where there was, in addition to the insurance, a separate contract with a third
party to repair or replace the property destroyed. Savarese v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 260
N.Y. 45, 182 N.E. 665 (1932); Foley v. The Mfr's & Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152
N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897); Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 272 App.
Div. 346, 71 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948); Rosen-
bloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15 N.Y.S.2d 304 (4th Dep't 1939); Tiemann
v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 76 App. Div. 5, 78 N.Y. Supp. 620 (1st Dep't 1902). But cf. Lamer v.
Commercial Assur. Co., 127 Misc. 1, 215 N.Y. Supp. 151 (Sup. Ct. 1926). The reasoning
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whereby the latter is obligated to repair the insured property, the courts will
not allow the insurance company to use this contract as a defense to payment. 3
This would appear to be an exception to the indemnity principle.14 In other
cases, where a lessee owns buildings or improvements on leased property, and
has a right to use for the term of the lease with right of removal within a stated
time after termination of the lease, the courts have held the insured's interest
in the buildings or improvements to be that of owner and not merely an interest
limited by a right to use45 or right to removeY° Therefore, while there is opinion
to the contrary in other jurisdictions,' 7 New York is inclined to give recovery
for the full cash value of the destroyed property despite the limited interest of
the insured. This reasoning was applied even where the policy included the
clause "nor in any event for more than the interest of the insured.' S This
could be interpreted as a tendency to construe this clause as one restricted to
partial interests, distinguished from limited interests.
While New York cases have stretched the indemnity principle so as to allow
recovery of full cash value even where the insured's interest is limited, this
departure is tempered by the rule laid down in McAnarney v. Ncawarh Fire Ins.
Co.' 9 In that case, the court of appeals, in referring to the indemnity nature
of fire insurance, stated that while full value should be given the jury must be
allowed to consider all factors which affect this cash value$0 This is to say
that when an insured is entitled to recover the full cash value of the subject of
the insurance, and this must include the cases mentioned above, the value is
not a fixed figure as in the case of a valued policy,2 ' or merely the replacement
of these cases seems to be that an insured should not be denied recovery because of a con-
tract which does not concern the insurance company.
13. See note 12 supra and cases cited therein.
14. Comment, Fire Insurance Recovery on a Limited Interest in Property, 50 Colum.
L. Rev. 960 (1950).
15. Modern Music Shop, Inc. v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 131 Misc. 305, 226 N.Y. Supp.
630 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1927).
16. Girard Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 6 App. Div. 2d 359, 177 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't 1958);
Laurent v. Chatham Fire Ins. Co., 1 N.Y. Super. (1 Hall) 41 (N.Y. Super. CL 1823). But
cf. Beekman v. Fulton & Al. Counties Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 66 App. Div. 72, 73
N.Y. Supp. 110 (3d Dep't 1901); Lamer v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 127 Mic. 1,
215 N.Y. Supp. 151 (Sup. CL 1926); Niblo v. North Am. Fire Ins. Co., 3 N.Y. Super.
(1 Sandf.) 551 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1348).
17. Harrington v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 510, 229 N.W. 792 (1930); Sievers v.
Union Assur. Soc'y, 20 Cal. App. 250, 128 Pac. 771 (1912).
18. Girard Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 6 App. Div. 2d 359, 177 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't 1958).
19. "Indemnity is the basis and foundation of all insurance law .... Where insured
buildings have been destroyed, the trier of the fact may, and should, call to its aid, in order
to effectuate complete indemnity, every fact and circumstance which would logically tend
to the formation of a correct estimate of the loss." McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co,
247 N.Y. 176, 184, 159 N.E. 902, 904-05 (1928).
20. Ibid.
21. A valued policy is distinguished from an indemnity policy in that the parties in the
former may agree to set an advance value on the property insured which will be the amount
of recovery in the event of loss. 1 Richards, Insurance § 21 (5th ed. 1952).
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value, but is relative to the financial loss of the insured. For this reason, the
court in the instant case should have followed the McAnarney decision in de-
termining the admissibility of the evidence of the plaintiff's tenancy so as to
arrive at the true value to the insured of his destroyed interest.22 The Mc-
Anarney case is controlling on the admissibility question, although not so on
the question of limited interest.
The court in the principal case also erred in holding that the policy was not
one of indemnity. The fact that New York will give full recovery to a lessee
with a limited interest is not to say that full replacement value of the insured
property should be given merely on proof of physical loss. 2 3 The standard fire
policy, in the absence of special provision, does not promise to replace the build-
ing absolutely, but to reimburse the insured for his loss of interest. To hold
otherwise would radically change the nature of fire insurance. New York cases
merely hold that the lessee's interest in a building or other improvements on
leased land is not limited for purposes of recovery, but is absolute.24 The de-
termination of the value of this lost interest is another question.
Both the circumstances surrounding the addition of the "interest clause" to
the standard fire policy and the true nature of indemnification and insurable
interest indicate that the clause, "nor in any event for more than the interest
of the insured," ought to be interpreted as limiting recovery to the extent of
the insured's partial or limited interest. However, it seems that in New York
the amount of recovery in cases of limited interest, at least, will be determined
to be the full cash value on the ground that the lessee who owns either a build-
ing or improvements on the premises leased will be considered the absolute
owner without reference to the impending loss of interest. The determination
of the cash value, however, as stated in the McAnarney case, is to be made with
all the factors before the court. If the rule in the McAnarney case is applied to
limit recovery in a situation presented by the instant case, then the differences
in approach between New York and those jurisdictions which consider the
lessee's interest as limited will become academic, at least in so far as the amount
of recovery is concerned.
22. The court in the instant case was faced with the question of whether to admit the
controversial evidence to determine the amount of recovery. In the course of its decision,
the court reasoned that in New York a lessee who owns a building on leased land with the
right to remove on termination of the lease is an absolute owner and should recover the
full cash value of the building when it is destroyed. 7 App. Div. 2d at 336, 183 N.Y.S.2d
at 121. But the evidence which the triers of fact may consider to determine the actual cash
value was squarely ruled upon in the McAnarney case, supra note 19.
23. To give absolute recovery merely on proof of physical loss is either to construe the
policy in the instant case as a valued policy or to completely reject the indemnity nature
of fire insurance. The former position is untenable because the policy here was in the
standard form, which, in the absence of special provision, is unquestionably considered to
be a contract of indemnity. See note 2 supra. To reject the indemnity nature of fire in-
surance is contrary to all authority. See, e.g., McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247
N.Y. 176, 184, 159 N.E. 902, 904-05 (1928).
24. Girard Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 6 App. Div. 2d 359, 177 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't 1958).
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Insurance-Variable Annuity Policies Subject to SEC Regulation.--In
an action by the Securities and Exchange Commission to enjoin the issuers of
variable annuity policies from offering their contracts to the public without
registering them under the Securities Act, and without complying with the
Investment Company Act, the district court dismissed the complaint, and the
court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States, four Justices dissenting, reversed. Variable annuity contracts which
guarantee to the policy holder annuitant periodic payments upon reaching a
certain age, the amount of which will vary according to the success of the
investment policy of the insurer, are not contracts of insurance. Issuers of such
contracts, therefore, are not exempt from compliance with the above mentioned
Acts, and are subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
The Securities Act of 19331 and the Investment Company Act of 19 4 0 - sub-
ject dealers in securities in interstate and foreign commerce to federal control,
but specifically exempt insurance companies from their provisions.a This
1. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1952). The Act was passed to protect the
unwary buyer of securities from the devices of the security salesmen who attempt to avoid
the state "blue sky" laws through the use of interstate and foreign commerce. Travelers
Health Ass'n-v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 US. 643, 653 (1950) (concurring
opinion of Douglas, J.). The Act provides for full disclosure of the details of the enterprise
by companies or individuals desiring to sell securities through the mails or in interstate
commerce by requiring registration with the SEC, and the transmittal of a prospectus to
every purchaser so that the investor can make an intelligent appraisal of any ristks involved.
48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1952). The prospectus is required to contain complete
financial statements, detailed information as to the type of venture, risks involved, under-
writing expenses, amount of capital needed, the interests of the management and promoters
in financial transactions and other matters. 48 Stat. 81 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77J (1952).
2. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1952). In order to protect investors from pur-
chasing securities from investment companies without adequate information of the financial
responsibilities and capabilities of these companies, Congress passed the Investment Com-
pany Act. This Act requires investment companies who use the mails or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce to register with the SEC. Such registration subjects the company
to regulations restricting personnel, capital structure and other various activities of the
investment company. 54 Stat. 803-05, 816, 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ Sga 3-10, 17, 18 (1952).
3. 48 Stat. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1952) provides:
(a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of the subchapter shall not
apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(S) Any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity con-
tract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commis-
sioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of
any state or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.
54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1952) provides that an investment company does
not include any insurance company, savings and loan association or similar institution.
48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1952) provides:
(1) The term 'security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or in-
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congressional policy was reinforced in 1945 by the enactment of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,4 which provides that "no Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance . . .unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance .... '"
The question presented was whether the Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company was in reality an investment company, or an insurance company
initiating a new mode of insurance. If it were the former, it would be subject
to SEC regulations, and would be obliged to make full disclosure of its invest-
ment activities. If it were the latter, it would under the applicable statutes be
exempt from making disclosure.
All states regulate both the ordinary life insurance policy and the standard
fixed annuity policy.6 The ordinary life insurance contract involves the pay-
ment of premiums by an insured over a number of years in return for which the
insurance company creates an immediate estate for a fixed amount in the event
of the insured's death. The benefits of the policy are paid to the named bene-
ficiary. This contract puts an immediate risk of loss upon the insurance com-
pany. The annuity type of insurance contract is almost diametrically opposed
to the ordinary life policy. The annuitant pays either a single fixed premium
or staggered premiums over a period of years to the insurer, in return for which
the company must then perform a series of obligations (payment to the insured
of a certain sum) over a period of years at designated intervals. The risk of
strument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1952) provides:
(a) When used in this subchapter . . . "investment company" means any issuer which-
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily,
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning,
holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities
having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (ex-
clusive of Government securities and cash terms) on an unconsolidated basis.
All states have laws and regulations covering the type and amount of securities which
insurance companies, given their charter by the state, may invest in. New York requires
that investments of foreign insurance companies doing business in New York must comply
in substance with the investment requirements of New York insurance companies. N.Y.
Ins. Law § 90.
Life insurance company investments have been and continue to be rigidly regulated, most
states limiting investments to the so-called "legal" securities of bonds and preferred stocks.
The modern tendency, however, has been, subject to state regulation, to broaden the in-
vestment field for life insurance companies to include "equity" securities or common stocks.
See Vance, Insurance § 5, at 43 (3d ed. 1951).
4. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1952). The Act was passed to offset the pos-
sible effects of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944),
which held that insurance companies can be engaged in interstate commerce for the pur-
poses of the antitrust statutes.
5. 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952). The McCarran-Ferguson Act also applies
to the District of Columbia.
6. See note 3 supra.
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loss is not on the company but on the annuitant who may die before the benefits
are received. An annuity policy does not create an immediate estate for the
benefit of others as does the ordinary life policy, but it reduces the annuitants
immediate estate in favor of a future contingent income. The annuity is in-
surance for life, as opposed to insurance against death, and is in reality an
investment. 7
Though ordinary annuities are really investments, they have been tradi-
tionally sold by insurance companies, and are regulated in all states as a
recognized feature of the insurance business. An insurance contract requires
that a risk be borne by the insurance company. This is found in the ordinary
annuity contract, wherein the insurer is required to pay a sum certain to the
annuitant over fixed intervals for life. The amount of annuitant's premiums is
determined by use of mortality tables. If the annuitant outlives the lifetime
normally predicted for him, the insurer will be required to pay the fixed pe-
riodical benefits until the death of the annuitant.8 The insurer thereby under-
takes and stands to suffer the risk that the applicant will outlive his life
expectancy as predicted by the mortality tables, i.e., the mortality risk.
The variable annuity added a distinctive feature to the ordinary fixed annuity.
The benefit payments are dependent upon the success of the insurance com-
pany's investment policy. The annuitant gives the insurance company carte
blanche for investment purposes, subject always to state regulation, by allowing
his premiums to be invested in securities for which he accrues certain "accu-
mulation units." The obligation owed to the annuitant by the insurance com-
pany is measured in terms of these "units." The value of the unit is recom-
puted at fixed intervals to determine the amount payable to the several
annuitants when the time has arrived to receive the benefits. These amounts
are determined by the investment experience of the company. The underlying
theory of the variable annuity is "that returns from investments in common
stocks would over the long run tend to compensate for the mounting inflation."*
7. 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § S3 (1941). In other words, "under the
ordinary life insurance policy the insured pays to the insurer an 'annuity' and his bene-
ficiary receives at the hisured's death the lump sum payment [whereas] under the usual
form of annuity the lump sum is paid to the insurance company immediately and the
annuitant receives the annuity payments so long as he lives." Vance, Insurance § 20, at
1020 (3d ed. 1951).
S. There are, of course, many varieties of annuities. The annuity payments may continue
throughout the life of the annuitant or for a stated term only. The policy can cover joint
lives, with payment of a fixed sum to be made to one person as long as he lives, and the
payment of the same sum or a lesser amount can be made to the survivor upon the death
of the first payee. The contract can provide that the insurer will be discharged fully by
periodic payments during the insured's life with nothing payable thereafter (no refund
annuity), or the contract may provide for total guaranteed annual payments which are
equal to the consideration paid for the contract, the refund being payable to the designated
beneficiary. Annuities can be incorporated into regular life policies or issued sQparately.
Quite a number of life policies have provisions for annuity options. See Vance, Insurance
§ 200, at 1020-21 (3d ed. 1951).
9. 359 U.S. at 70. The first variable annuity was created in 1952, when Xewv York
initiated the College Retirement Equities Fund.
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Clearly, the variable annuity is not a conventional insurance policy. It was
not contemplated by Congress when it enacted the Securities Act and the In-
vestment Company Act. The variable annuity contains both insurance and
security aspects. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company bears a resem-
blance to that institution intended to be regulated by the Investment Company
Act. The "units" of the variable annuity are somewhat akin to the shares of
an investment company, except that the shareholder therein has a beneficial
ownership up to the amount of his shares, whereas the annuitant does not own
any part of the insurance company. Both the "unit" and the share will deter-
mine the actual cash value of the investment. However, the variable annuity
policy subjects the issuer to the same mortality risk as the ordinary annuity
issuer which is, of course, an insurance feature.
The only prior judicial determination concerning variable annuities was
Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n,10 where the Connecticut Commissioner of
Insurance brought an action for a declaratory judgment to restrain American
Life, a domestic fraternal benefit society, from issuing to its members a pro-
posed variable endowment policy" with an option therein for a variable annuity.
American Life was licensed under the insurance laws of Connecticut, and au-
thorized to issue term, life, endowment and annuity certificates and combina-
tions thereof. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut upheld the State
Insurance Commissioner, deciding that the type of policy proposed involved
such a basic change in insurance procedure that it would require a legislative
act to sanction it. 12
In the instant case the Company was authorized to issue variable annuity
policies by the Insurance Commissioner of the District of Columbia, wherein
it was chartered, and the Commissioners of Arkansas, Kentucky and West
Virginia. After the trial the Company received authority from the Commis-
sioners of Alabama and New Mexico. These Commissioners, by their approval,
thereby impliedly disagreed with Connecticut, and appeared to conclude that
the variable annuity constitutes a valid insurance agreement.
10. 144 Conn. 346, 131 A.2d 834 (1957).
11. An endowment policy is similar to an annuity in that the insured pays a premium
or premiums over a period of years to the company in return for a single lump sum
benefit at the end of the payin period rather than the smaller yearly benefits, which is tho
distinguishing feature of the annuity. The endowment is usually payable to the insured
or his beneficiary.
12. That court, after hearing the insurance company's argument concerning the de-
preciation of the dollar, and that the insured had no assurance that the value of his endow-
ment or annuity would remain constant, stated:
There is a real distinction, however, between the general depreciation in the value of the
dollar and the depreciation which may occur in the value of units in a variable endowment
or annuity fund such as is contemplated in the present case. The former is due to wide-
spread economic factors affecting all alike. The latter may be due to such factors, reflected
in a general decline in the market value of securities . . . but it may also be due to possible
poor judgment or lack of skill in the management of the investments in the particular fund.
When an endowment or annuity is payable in a specified number of dollars, an insured
runs the risk of depreciation of the dollar. When it is payable in variable endowment or
annuity units, he runs the risk of depreciation of the unit, measured in dollars, including
the added risk that it may be depreciated by reason of factors not traceable to general
economic conditions. The defendant escapes this type of risk and transfers it to the insured.
144 Conn. at 357-58, 131 A.2d at 840.
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In the immediate case Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, rea-
soned that "the issuer of a variable annuity that has no element of a fixed
return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense .... They guarantee nothing
to the annuitant except an interest in a portfolio of common stocks or other
equities-an interest that has a ceiling but no floor."' 3 The Court concluded
that the investment risk traditionally on the insurer has now been placed on
the insured. The Company was, therefore, an investment company, and not an
insurance company, though it had some elements of insurance. It was, con-
sequently, subject to SEC regulation.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in joining the majority, wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which he contended that the administration of the variable annuity
contracts involved to a large extent the business of an investment company,
and was completely alien to the ordinary life annuity insurance company as
traditionally regulated by the states. He reasoned that the regulations requiring
full disclosure, rather than close supervision of assets, were more suited to
protect the investor. Hence, he concluded, Congress did not intend to exempt
the variable annuity.'
The dissenting opinion took the position that legitimate insurance experi-
mentation should be encouraged, even though a feature of the particular de-
velopment may contain security aspects. Mr. Justice Harlan argued that the
law of insurance is not and should not remain static. As new concepts of the
insurance business are developed the states must follow suit, and modify and
adjust their controls to meet the exigencies of new developments. The dissent
concluded that the variable annuity should be exempt from federal regulation
of securities, unless Congress specifically enacts a statute to the contrary.Y5
Is the investment risk an insurable risk as stated by the majority? It does
not appear so. Duly licensed insurance companies are governed by the states
in which they are chartered. State regulations fix the type and amount of in-
vestments by statute. Constant supervision is maintained by the Insurance
Commissioners of the various states and of the District of Columbia. Indeed
"the business of insurance has been more generally regulated than any other
sphere of business activity not a public utility."'0
The primary risk that the annuitant attempts to shift when he contracts for
an annuity, variable or not, is that he will live longer than his monetary supply
will last. The insurer assumes the risk of the annuitant's death, i.e., the mor-
tality risk. There is much to be said for the underlying theory of the variable
annuity, that is the risk of depreciation of the dollar. Holders of traditional
annuity policies in Germany lost all their protection in the inflation of the
twenties. Similar results occurred in other European countries.y
The dissenting opinion would appear to present a more realistic approach to
the problem. The variable annuity contract has many of the standard provisions
13. 359 U.S. at 71-72.
14. Id. at 85 (concurring opinion of Brennan, I.).
15. Id. at 100 (Earlan, J., dissenting).
16. American Hospital Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719, 721 (Sth Cir. 1957).
17. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 257 F.2d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd,
359 US. 65 (1959).
19591
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of insurance. It was not formulated as a device to avoid the above mentioned
Acts of 1933 and 1940. Traditionally, the states have been free to regulate
insurance. "[T]he McCarran Act was designed to assure that existing state
power to regulate insurance would continue."' 8 If the Insurance Commissioner
of the state recognizes the variable annuity as being primarily insurance, the
Securities Act and the Investment Company Act should not apply because of
the specific exemptions given to insurance companies therein, and because of
the provisions of the McCarran Act. "Courts are pointedly told to leave states
free to regulate 'the business of insurance' in the absence of some congressional
act that 'specifically relates' to the same subject."'19 This, Congress has not
done. Hence, the primary responsibility for the supervision of the variable
annuity should rest with the Insurance Commissioners of the various states.
Statute of Frauds-Promise Not Within Statute Where Promisor Is In-
dependently Liable.-Defendant Wishnetzky, the holder of a chattel mortgage
on certain fixtures of the Elberon Restaurant Corporation, informed the plaintiff,
conditional vendor of other fixtures in Elberon's restaurant, of his desire to take
over and manage the said restaurant business, and promised the plaintiff that
if he would forbear taking any action on the conditional sales contract, the de-
fendant would pay all Elberon's notes in full. Wishnetzky foreclosed his mort-
gage, took over the business, and had in fact paid ten notes up to the time the
business was closed. This action was brought for the balance due on the re-
maining notes. The appellate term, holding that nothing indicated that the
parties intended the defendant to be the principal debtor primarily liable, re-
versed the municipal court's finding for the plaintiff.' The appellate division
reversed, holding that the promise made the defendant independently liable,
and that he was receiving a definite business benefit, thereby taking the promise
out of the Statute of Frauds. Biener Contracting Corp. v. Elberon Restaurant
Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 391, 183 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1959).
By the express terms of the New York statute, an oral promise to pay the
debt of another is void.2 This, like most rules of law, is not without exception.3
One exception is the main purpose or beneficial consideration rule, which
makes a promise enforceable provided a new and beneficial consideration runs
to the promisor.4 The New York Court of Appeals, although at one time
18. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 319 (1955).
19. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
1. Biener Contracting Corp. v. Elberon Restaurant Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 436, 179 N.Y.S.2d
941 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1958).
2. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31 provides: "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is
void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or un-
dertaking .. .is a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
person ... .
3. Professor Calamari delineates the exceptions in his article, The Suretyship Statute
of Frauds, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 332 (1958).
4. Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396 (1841).
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endorsing this majority view,5 has added a requirement where a prior obliga-
tion by the original debtor exists at the time of the promise. 6 The resultant
New York main purpose rule is definitely set forth in the oft'cited and
oft'quoted case of White v. Rintoul,7 wherein it is stated:
[W]here the primary debt subsists, and was antecedently contracted, the promise
to pay it is original when it is founded on a new consideration moving to the
promisor and beneficial to him, and such that the promisor thereby comes under
an independent duty of payment, irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor 8
In New York, therefore, for a promise to be construed as originalO there is
the additional requirement that the defendant promisor be independently liable
irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor.'0
In relatively few instances have New York courts found compliance
with the rule.1 A determination that the promisor's liability was contingent
upon the default of the original debtor, rather than independent of and ir-
respective of the liability of the debtor, has usually been the reason for the
courts holding the promise collateral. 12 Whether the defendant in the imme-
5. Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412 (1860). The court pointed out the fallacy in the test
laid down in Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. R. 29 (N.Y. 1811), where it was said that
the mere receipt of new consideration by the promisor would take the case out of the
statute. 21 N.Y. at 417. Such a rule would effectively eliminate the Statute of Frauds, as
consideration is always necessary to support a promise.
6. In Brown v. Weber, 38 N.Y. 187 (1868), the court, by way of dictum, said that "the
test to be applied to every case is, whether the party sought to be charged is the principal
debtor, primarily liable, or whether he is only liable in case of the default of a third person;
in other words, whether he is the debtor, or whether his relation to the creditor is that of
surety to him for the performance, by some other person, of the obligation of the latter to
the creditor." Id. at 189. Professor Calamari contended that the additional requirement is
not necessary to take the promise out of the statute where there is no obligation owing
from the contemplated debtor to the plaintiff at the time of the promise. Calamari, supra
note 3, at 343.
7. 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888).
8. Id. at 227, 15 N.E. at 320.
9. The terms "original" and "collateral" are used to distinguish between cases "with-
out" and "within" the statute. Arnold, The Main Purpose Rule and the Statute of Frauds,
10 Cornell L.Q. 28 (1924).
10. Professor Williston simply suggests that "the true test . . . of a new oral promisa
should be: Is the new promisor a surety"? 2 Williston, Contracts § 475, at 136S (rev. ed.
1936). This view was mentioned with approval in Witschard v. A. Brady & Sons, Inc., 257
N.Y. 97, 177 N.E. 385 (1931). The "surety" test seems to be consonant with the rule
of White v. Rintoul, note 7 supra, since a finding that the promisor is a surety will
necessitate a determination of whether the promisor is promising to pay his own or an-
other's obligation. A surety is one who has become liable to discharge another's debt. 4
Williston, Contracts § 1211 (rev. ed. 1936).
11. Conway, Subsequent Oral Promise To Perform Another's Duty and The New York
Statute of Frauds, 22 Fordham L. Rev. 119, 130 (1953).
12. In Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918), the court seem-
ingly could have found the promise collateral based upon the remoteness of the benefit to
the promisor; but the court preferred to base its decision upon the failure of the promisor
to assume an independent duty of payment.
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diate case assumed an independent duty of payment is, therefore, the prime
consideration in determining whether his promise is within or without the
statute.13 Precedents are of little help in ascertaining the factors necessary for
compliance with this distinctive New York requirement.
The court of appeals, in Raabe v. Squier,14 relied upon by the appellate
division in the instant case, in quoting and following the rule of White v.
Rintoul'5 held the defendant's promise original. However, the meaning of the
"independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal
debtor" requirement was not in the least clarified by the Raabe case. Except
for its quotation from White v. Rintoul, the court did not discuss the require-
ment,16 and there is some question as to whether the requirement was per-
tinent. 7
Whereas the agreement between the principal and surety is ordinarily de-
terminative of their relationship,' 8 the agreement between the creditor and
surety is for Statute of Frauds purposes determinative of whether the promisor
becomes primarily liable.' 9 In Richardson Press v. Albright,2 0 notwithstanding
that the promisor absolutely promised to pay the debt, the court looked to the
intention of the parties as evidenced by their subsequent dealings, and held the
promise unenforceable. The fact that the credit was extended primarily to the
13. The court in the instant case was somewhat concerned with the benefit accruing to
the defendant promisor. The defendant made this promise solely for his own benefit. Ic
intended to immediately take over the business, the fixtures subject to the conditional sales
contract being an essential part. Since the consideration was a definite business advantage
to the promisor, it would seem sufficiently beneficial to take the promise out of the Statute
of Frauds.
14. 148 N.Y. 81, 42 N.E. 516 (1895).
15. 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888).
16. The court said the existence of a new consideration beneficial to the promisor
brought the case within the rule of White v. Rintoul, supra note 7. 148 N.Y. at 87, 42
N.E. at 518.
17. Professor Calamari contends that the only time the additional requirement of
White v. Rintoul, supra note 7, is necessary is when there is a prior obligation of the
original debtor owing to the plaintiff at the time of defendant's promise. Calamarl, supra
note 3, at 343. In the Raabe case, supra note 14, the plaintiff had refused to deliver any
further installments of woodwork under the contract because, although he had been paid
for the delivered installments, the payments had been late. Professor Calamarl, supra note
3, at 349, submits that the judge in Raabe v. Squier, in finding all the elements of the
White decision met, is saying that "debt" as used in the rule should not be taken In the
strict sense, but is used synonymously with the broader word "obligation." See 2 Corbln,
Contracts § 347 (1950). There would, therefore, be the necessary antecedent debt.
However, Professor Conway, supra note 11, at 131, says that "the promise was not to
pay an antecedent debt but rather a debt created after and in consideration of the promise."
If this were the correct view there would be no need for a finding of the additional re-
quirement of the White case.
18. Conway, Subsequent Oral Promise to Perform Another's Duty and the New York
Statute of Frauds, 22 Fordham L. Rev. 119, 138 (1953).
19. Id. at 140.
20. 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918).
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original debtor, and that recovery was sought from the promisor only after the
resources of the original debtor were exhausted, indicated that the promise was
intended by the promisor and accepted by the creditor to be collateral to the
original debtor's liability.2 1 The mere unconditional form of the promise was
held insufficient to take the case out of the statute," but where the form of a
promise is itself conditional it will be deemed collateral without further in-
quiry.
3
The appellate division in the Biener case quoted the defendant's promise
verbatim and concluded that it made him independently liable.24 While the
unequivocal promise of the defendant here was certainly strong evidence of an
intention to become a principal debtor primarily liable, it alone should not be
controlling.25 It appears that the court, properly following the lead suggested
in the Richardson Press decision, looked to the subsequent dealings of the
creditor and promisor to determine the intention of the parties. Whereas in the
Richardson Press case the creditor looked first to the original debtor for pay-
ment, here the creditor not only looked to the promisor for payment, but was
in fact paid in part by the promisor. The fact that the plaintiff first pursued
the defendant for payment is significant in demonstrating that credit had been
extended principally to the defendant promisor, and that the defendant was
accordingly the principal debtor primarily liable.2 6 The court has thereby found
the independent duty of payment requirement of White v. Rintozd satisfied by
resorting to an examination of the subsequent dealings between the creditor
and the promisor to determine their intention at the time of the promise in
issue.
Taxation-Attorney's Lien as Property.-The City of New York instituted
a condemnation proceeding to acquire title to realty. The condemnee entered
into a retainer contract assigning to his attorney twenty percent of the avard
for services. After the decree of condemnation was signed, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue filed a lien for taxes owed by the condemnee. The attorney
moved at special term to have his lien enforced and the Government cross-
moved for an order to declare its tax lien. The appellate division affirmed the
lower court's order that the tax lien of the United States was subordinate to
the tax lien of the attorney. Upon appeal, the New York Court of Appeals, one
judge dissenting, affirmed. An attorney by virtue of an assignment of a portion
of a condemnation award under a retainer contract is a purchaser of property
or rights to property within the meaning of federal tax lien statutes, and,
21. The court recognized that the promisor's beneficial interest was remote. Id. at 501,
121 N.E. at 362. However, the decision was based upon the fact that the promisor did not
have an independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor.
Bulkley v. Shaw, 289 N.Y. 133, 137-33, 44 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1942).
22. Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N.Y. 498, 121 N.E. 362 (1918).
23. Conway, supra note 11, at 137.
24. 7 App. Div. 2d, 391, 392, 183 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (1st Dep't 1959).
25. Conway, supra note 11, at 137.
26. Conway, supra note 11, at 136.
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therefore, the attorney's lien is superior to the tax lien of the United States.
In re Washington Square Slum Clearance, 5 N.Y.2d 300, 157 N.E.2d 587, 184
N.Y.S.2d 585 (1959).
Liens for taxes owing to the federal government attach only to property and
rights to property belonging to the taxpayer.' Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Commissioner v. Stern,2 federal courts, following the principle that
the right of the Government to levy and collect taxes uniformly may not be
defeated by state regulation, 3 held that the relative priority of a lien for unpaid
taxes was always a question for the federal courts, and the state's characteriza-
tion of its liens, while good for all state purposes, did not necessarily bind the
federal courts. 4 The Stern case held, however, that the task of defining "prop-
erty" as the term is used in the federal tax statutes is the function of the state
wherein the taxpayer resides.5 As a result of this distinction, the priority of
liens remained a federal question,0 yet the state could determine what was not
taxable in the first instance by defining what rights under local law were
property or rights to property. In the latter situation, then, the question of
priority is never reached by the federal courts.
In the principal case the condemnee did not assign an interest in his leasehold
to his attorney, but rather a percentage of his cause of action.7 Granting the
leasehold is property," the question remains whether the percentage of the
cause of action assigned represents property. The majority, without citing any
authority, without further explanation and without adding any reasons for its
1. 53 Stat. 449 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 3672 (1952) provides: "Such lien shall not be valid
as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has
been filed by the collector. . . ." 53 Stat. 448 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 3670 (1952) provides: "If
any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to
property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." Such liens are not valid
against any purchaser until notice thereof has been duly filed by the collector. 53 Stat. 449
(1939), 26 U.S.C. § 3671 (1952).
2. 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
3. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010, rehearing denied, 351 U.S.
958 (1956); United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955) ; United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S.
218 (1955); United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
4. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1937); Bankers
Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308 (1932) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
5. The Supreme Court declared that "since Congress has not manifested a desire for
uniformity of liability [in the Revenue Act], we think that the creation of a federal deci-
sional law would be inappropriate in these cases . . . the federal courts must now apply
state decisional law in defining state-created rights, obligations, and liabilities." 357 U.S.
at 45.
6. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. Waddill Co., 323 U.S.
353 (1945).
7. The contract between the parties provided that the client agrees "'to pay, and
• . . assign to said Bernard W. Coblentz for his services in the matter Twenty (20%)
per cent of the award and interest that may be paid or awarded for the said property.'" 5
N.Y.2d at 305, 157 N.E.2d at 589, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
8. Matter of Ehrsam, 37 App. Div. 272, 55 N.Y.S. 942 (4th Dep't 1889).
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conclusion, held that a cause of action was property.0 New York courts have
held that a vested right of action is property in the sense that tangible things
are property. This is so whether it springs from contract or principles of
common law.' 0 In the instant case the United States did not deny that the
condemnee's cause of action was property within the meaning of section 3670
of the Internal Revenue Code." It asserted, however, that the attorney's lien
was not property because it was contingent upon the outcome of the trial, and
was but a caveat of a more perfect lien yet to come. The United States based
its contention upon a series of similar cases'- decided before the Stern decision.
In United States v. Pay-O-Matic Corp.,'3 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York decided, on facts for all practical purposes indistinguish-
able from the instant case, that under New York law the attorney's lien was
inchoate and, thus, the question was one of priority. The importance of this
decision is academic today in the light of the Stern case since it is for the state
to define the nature of property.' 4
The attorney's lien, a creature of statute in New York,'5 requires no express
9. N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 39 provides: "The term personal property includes chattels,
money, things in action, and all written instruments themselves, as distinguished from the
rights or interests to which they relate, by which any right, interest, lien or incumbrance
in, to or upon property, or any debt or financial obligation is created, acknowledged, evi-
denced, transferred, discharged or defeated, wholly or in part, and everything, except real
property, which may be the subject of ownership." while a cause for certain actions may
not be within the definition of a thing in action, courts have held that a cause of action is
embraced in the broadest sense of that term. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17
(1889). Accord, Wilson v. Aeolian Co., 64 App. Div. 337, 72 N.Y. Supp. 150 (2d Dep't 1901),
aff'd, 170 N.Y. 618, 63 N.E. 1123 (1902). We may conclude that a cause of action, broadly
considered as a thing in action, is property. However, the purpose of the General Construc-
tion Law is to define statutory terms used in the laws of New York. People v. New York
Cent. & H.R.R., 156 N.Y. 570, 51 N.E. 312 (1898). It is questionable whether Congress
intended that the provisions of the federal tax statutes be construed by the state according
to definitions intended by the state legislature to prescribe state statutes. There is ample
argument that the Stern case, supra note 2, should not be so loosely construed as to permit
such a result. It is, perhaps, better to reason that the Stern Court decided in favor of state
decisional law rather than statutory law.
10. Mlinch v. American Radiator Co., 263 App. Div. 573, 34 N.YS.2d 16 (4th Dep't),
appeal granted, 264 App. Div. 828, 35 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 631, 45
N.E.2d 333 (1942). Accord, Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., S0 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. CL),
aff'd, 268 App. Div. 905, 51 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 263 App. Div. 978,
52 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1st Dep't 1944).
11. 53 Stat. 448 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 3670 (1952). Indeed the United States hastened
to assert that the condemnee's cause of action was property in order that the Government
might have a basis for its lien.
12. United States v. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (195); United States v. Scovil, 34S
U.S. 218 (1955) ; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) ; United States v. Hawk"ns, 228
F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1955).
13. 162 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Goldstein, 256 F2d
581 (2d Cir. 1958).
14. See note 5 supra.
15. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 475 provides: "From the commencement of an action, special
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notice to bring it into existence.' 6 The attorney's lien vests at the time the
action is commenced. 17 The fact that recovery must await judgment does not
render the lien inchoate. It merely affects the amount of recovery. The ma-
jority, using this approach, argued that the attorney's lien, being vested, is
a cause of action in itself and, therefore, property.18 Judge Fuld, relying in his
dissent upon federal decisional law, contended that since there was no assurance
of recovery the attorney's lien did not vest, and further, that it was erroneous
to presume the attorney to be a purchaser within the ordinary meaning of the
word where there was no vendor-vendee relationship. 19
Clearly, in the light of Stern and of the famous Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
20
decision, federal "common law" is not determinative of matters of exclusive
state jurisdiction. The statutory and case law of New York define property
broadly as anything that may be the subject of ownership. However, it is
questionable whether Congress intended to allow the individual states to pro-
scribe the effective enforcement of liens for unpaid taxes. It is not unreasonable
to assume that many of the state-created rights which heretofore had not taken
the status of property will, in the future, be construed as property under local
law so as to avoid the federal question of lien priority.
In the instant case the court held that the attorney had a property interest by
virtue of his retainer contract. The question remains, in the absence of an
express assignment in a retainer contract, whether a lien arising solely by
virtue of section 475 of the Judiciary Law of New York will be construed as
property. It would appear, in view of the present decision, that the court of
appeals might be ready to classify the lien as property simply because it is
vested.
or other proceeding in any court ... the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon
his client's cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report,
determination, decision, judgment or final order in his client's favor, and the proceeds
thereof in whatever hands they may come; and the lien cannot be affected by any
settlement between the parties before or after judgment, final order or determination."
16. At common law the lien of the attorney on the judgment secured by his client is in
its inception merely an inchoate one, not ripening into an actual lien until the attorney
asserts it and gives notice thereof to the judgment debtor. Jennings v. Bacon, 84 Iowa 403,
51 N.W. 15 (1892); Manning v. Leighton, 65 Vt. 84, 26 Atl. 258 (1892). Cf. Peri v. New
York Cent. & H.R.R., 152 N.Y. 521, 46 N.E. 849 (1897).
However, an exception to the doctrine that no lien exists on the mere cause of action
pertains to cases where the attorney has contracted with his client for a lien on the cause of
action. Here the effect is as if the lien were one conferred by law. Carpenter v. Myers, 90
Mich. 209, 51 N.W. 206 (1892); Button's Estate v. Anderson, 112 Vt. 531, 28 A.2d 404
(1942).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. 5 N.Y.2d at 307, 157 N.E.2d at 590-91, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
19. 5 N.Y.2d at 315-16, 157 N.E.2d at 595-96, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98 (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
